The Claim

Negotiated massive soybean purchase agreements with China and Bangladesh, reopening critical export markets.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

Three factual claims: (1) The administration negotiated soybean purchase agreements with both China and Bangladesh. (2) These agreements were “massive” in scale. (3) They “reopened” export markets that had been closed.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That these markets were closed by someone else — perhaps by Chinese or Bangladeshi policy, or by the Biden administration’s failure. That the administration’s deal-making skill produced gains for American farmers. That this represents forward progress rather than recovery from self-inflicted losses. That the deal with China and the deal with Bangladesh are comparable in scale and nature.

What is conspicuously absent?

Any mention that the China soybean market collapsed in 2025 because of this administration’s own tariffs and the resulting Chinese retaliatory tariffs. That U.S. soybean exports to China during the Biden years averaged over 26 million metric tons annually — and the “massive” new deal commits China to purchasing at most 25 MMT per year, which is less than what was flowing before the disruption. That the Bangladesh “agreement” consists of non-binding letters of intent signed by private companies, not a government-negotiated trade agreement. That the administration paid $12 billion in emergency “Farmer Bridge” payments in December 2025 to compensate farmers for the very market losses this claim implies never happened. That this is the second time Trump tariffs have destroyed the China soybean market and required a taxpayer-funded bailout — the first round (2018-2019) cost $23 billion.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

China’s retaliatory tariffs in response to Trump’s 2025 tariffs devastated U.S. soybean exports. In 2024, the U.S. exported approximately 26.8 million metric tons of soybeans to China, valued at $12.6 billion. After Trump imposed escalating tariffs on Chinese goods beginning in February 2025, China retaliated with tariffs that raised the effective duty on U.S. soybeans to 24%. By mid-2025, the U.S. shipped virtually no soybeans to China during June, July, and August. January-August 2025 volumes collapsed to 218 million bushels, down from 985 million bushels in the same period in 2024. As of mid-September 2025, China had not purchased any new-crop U.S. soybeans for the first time since USDA began tracking data in 1999. ¹

The U.S. consistently exported over 26 million metric tons of soybeans to China annually during the Biden administration. USDA data shows the U.S. exported more than 26 MMT of soybeans to China every year from 2021 through 2024. The five-year average (2020-2024) was 29 MMT. These markets were not “closed” before Trump took office — they were operating at or above historical norms. The only two years since 2017 when China purchased fewer than 22 MMT of U.S. soybeans were 2018 (Trump’s first trade war) and 2025 (Trump’s second trade war). ²

The November 2025 China deal commits to less than pre-disruption volumes. Following the Trump-Xi meeting in late October 2025, the administration announced China would purchase at least 12 MMT of U.S. soybeans by end of 2025 (later extended to February 2026) and at least 25 MMT annually from 2026 through 2028. The 25 MMT annual commitment is 14% below the five-year average of 29 MMT and nearly 4 MMT below the pre-trade-war average (2013-2017) of 28.8 MMT. The deal’s minimum is lower than what China was already buying before the tariff disruption. ³

Early implementation of the China deal fell far short of commitments. As of mid-November 2025, China had purchased only 332,000 metric tons — 2.8% of the stated 12 MMT year-end target. By January 2026, cumulative purchases had reached an estimated 8.5-10 million tons, still below the 12 MMT commitment even after the deadline was extended. China imported no U.S. soybeans for three consecutive months (September through November 2025), and the first physical shipments since May did not arrive until late in the year. ⁴

The Bangladesh “agreement” consists of non-binding letters of intent from private companies, not a government-negotiated trade deal. On November 4, 2025, five Bangladeshi companies (Meghna Group, City Group, Delta Agrofood, Mahbub Group, KGS Group) signed letters of intent facilitated by the U.S. Soybean Export Council (USSEC) — an industry trade group, not a government agency. The letters pledged $1.25 billion in U.S. soybean and soybean meal purchases over 12 months. The U.S. government’s role was supportive (the U.S. Charge d’Affaires “welcomed” the agreement) rather than negotiating. Bangladesh’s total soybean import market (~2.2-2.4 MMT annually) is roughly 2% the size of China’s. ⁵

The administration paid $12 billion in “Farmer Bridge” payments in December 2025 to compensate farmers for trade-war losses. On December 8, 2025, USDA announced a $12 billion emergency aid package including $30.88 per acre for soybean farmers. This is the second Trump-era farmer bailout — the Market Facilitation Program (2018-2019) paid $23 billion in the first trade war. Combined, Trump’s two trade wars have cost taxpayers approximately $35 billion in direct farmer compensation for market losses caused by tariff retaliation. ⁶

This is the second time Trump tariffs have destroyed and then “restored” the China soybean market. In 2018, Trump’s first-term tariffs caused China’s soybean purchases to collapse from 36.1 MMT (2016) to 8.2 MMT (2018). The Phase One deal (January 2020) partially restored trade, which the Biden administration maintained. In 2025, the second round of tariffs triggered an identical collapse. The pattern is: impose tariffs, lose the market, bail out farmers with taxpayer funds, negotiate to partially restore trade, and claim the partial restoration as a “win.” ⁷

Strong Inferences

China has persistently failed to meet soybean purchase commitments under Trump-era trade deals. Under Phase One (2020), China committed to $80 billion in agricultural purchases but delivered only $60 billion, then gradually redirected imports toward Brazil and Argentina. U.S. agricultural exports to China fell from $41 billion (2022) to $27 billion (2024). The new deal’s structure — minimum commitments with no enforcement mechanism and persistent retaliatory tariffs — mirrors Phase One, which China underfulfilled. ⁸

The Bangladesh deal likely reflects opportunistic buying during a price glut, not durable market opening. Bangladesh’s soybean imports from the U.S. surged 310% in September-December 2025, driven by U.S. soybeans being approximately $10/ton cheaper than Brazilian alternatives — a direct consequence of China’s boycott leaving U.S. farmers with surplus stock. The non-binding letters of intent were signed during this temporary price advantage. Whether Bangladesh sustains these volumes when U.S. soybean prices normalize remains uncertain. ⁹

What the Evidence Shows

The claim presents the partial restoration of a self-inflicted wound as a diplomatic achievement. The China soybean market was not “closed” by some external force that required reopening — it was thriving at 26+ million metric tons annually when Trump took office in January 2025. The market collapsed specifically because of this administration’s tariff escalation, which triggered Chinese retaliatory tariffs that made U.S. soybeans uncompetitive against Brazilian alternatives. From June through November 2025, China bought essentially no U.S. soybeans — the first such shutout in the USDA’s tracking history. The administration then negotiated a deal that commits China to purchasing 25 MMT annually, which is 14% less than what was flowing before the disruption and nearly 4 MMT below pre-trade-war averages.

The arsonist-firefighter dynamic here is identical to 2018: Trump’s tariffs destroyed the market, cost taxpayers $23 billion in farmer bailouts, and then the Phase One deal was celebrated as a “win” even though it never fully restored pre-war trade levels. Now the cycle has repeated — tariffs destroyed the market again, the administration announced a $12 billion farmer bailout in December 2025, and the partial restoration is being claimed as an achievement. The combined taxpayer cost of these two cycles of market destruction and partial recovery is approximately $35 billion.

The Bangladesh component of the claim is misleading in a different way. The $1.25 billion in “letters of intent” were signed by private companies, facilitated by an industry trade group (USSEC), not negotiated by the administration. They are non-binding. They were driven partly by fire-sale pricing on U.S. soybeans caused by the China shutout. And Bangladesh’s entire soybean import market (~2.4 MMT) is roughly 2% of China’s (~100+ MMT). Describing private-sector letters of intent in a small market alongside a government trade deal with the world’s largest soybean buyer, as though they are comparable achievements, obscures the massive difference in scale and nature.

The Bottom Line

There is a factual core here: the administration did negotiate soybean purchase commitments with China in October-November 2025, and private Bangladeshi firms did sign letters of intent for U.S. soybean purchases. These events occurred. But framing them as “massive” agreements that “reopened critical export markets” is misleading in every important respect. The markets were open and thriving before this administration’s tariffs closed them. The China deal commits to less than pre-disruption volumes. The Bangladesh deal was not government-negotiated and involves non-binding pledges in a market that is a rounding error compared to China. The claim omits the $12 billion taxpayer-funded farmer bailout necessitated by the very market disruption the deals purport to solve. This is the diplomatic equivalent of breaking a window and then claiming credit for the repair — while billing the homeowner for the labor and leaving the window slightly smaller than before.

Sources

Footnotes

1. American Farm Bureau Federation, “Agricultural Trade: China Steps Back from U.S. Soybeans,” September 2025. Jan-Aug 2025 soybean exports to China: 218M bushels vs. 985M bushels in same period 2024. “Virtually no soybeans” shipped June-August. https://www.fb.org/market-intel/agricultural-trade-china-steps-back-from-u-s-soybeans; American Soybean Association, “Unfilled Chinese Soy Demand,” September 2025. First time since 1999 that China had not purchased new-crop soybeans by mid-September. https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/unfilled-chinese-soy-demand/ ↩

2. Reason, “Trump Says China Didn’t Buy Soybeans While Biden Was President. Here’s What the Data Show,” December 10, 2025. “America consistently exported more than 26 million metric tons of soybeans to China” annually during Biden years. https://reason.com/2025/12/10/trump-says-china-didnt-buy-soybeans-while-biden-was-president-heres-what-the-data-show/; farmdoc daily, University of Illinois, “U.S.-China Soybean Deal: Comparing Past Export Levels and Global Market Impacts,” November 2025. Five-year average (2020-2024): 29 MMT. https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/11/us-china-soybean-deal-comparing-past-export-levels-and-global-market-impacts.html ↩

3. American Farm Bureau Federation, “China Phase ‘Two’: What We Know Right Now,” November 2025. China committed to 12 MMT by end of 2025, then 25 MMT annually 2026-2028. https://www.fb.org/market-intel/china-phase-two-what-we-know-right-now; farmdoc daily, November 2025. 25 MMT commitment is “14% lower than the five-year average of 29 million tons.” Pre-trade-war (2013-2017) average: 28.8 MMT. https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/11/us-china-soybean-deal-comparing-past-export-levels-and-global-market-impacts.html; South China Morning Post. New commitment of 25 MMT is “nearly four million tons less each year” than pre-war average. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3334973/trump-seizes-china-ban-brazil-select-soy-trade-data-shows-us-gains-small ↩

4. Fortune, “China Has Only Bought 332,000 Tons of U.S. Soybeans Since Trump Made a Deal with Xi Jinping,” November 16, 2025. 332,000 MT total = 2.8% of 12 MMT commitment. https://fortune.com/2025/11/16/china-us-soybean-purchases-trump-xi-jinping-trade-deal/; Farm Policy News, University of Illinois, “China’s US Soy Purchases Approach 10 Million Tons,” January 2026. Estimated 8.5-10 MMT by January 2026. No physical imports September-November. https://farmpolicynews.illinois.edu/2026/01/chinas-us-soy-purchases-approach-10-million-tons/ ↩

5. U.S. Soybean Export Council (USSEC), “Bangladesh’s Soy Processing Industry and Soybean Meal Importers Pledge to Purchase Over $1.25 Billion,” November 2025. Letters of intent signed by five private companies. USSEC facilitated; U.S. government role was “welcoming.” https://ussec.org/news/bangladeshs-soy-processing-industry-and-soybean-meal-importers-pledge-to-purchase-over-1-25-billion-of-u-s-soybean-and-soybean-meal-in-landmark-agreement/; Bangladesh total soybean imports ~2.2-2.4 MMT (USDA FAS, Bangladesh Oilseeds and Products Annual). https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Oilseeds+and+Products+Annual_Dhaka_Bangladesh_BG2025-0002.pdf ↩

6. USDA, “Trump Administration Announces $12 Billion Farmer Bridge Payments for American Farmers Impacted by Unfair Market Disruptions,” December 8, 2025. Soybean payment: $30.88/acre. https://www.usda.gov/about-usda/news/press-releases/2025/12/08/trump-administration-announces-12-billion-farmer-bridge-payments-american-farmers-impacted-unfair; Market Facilitation Program (2018-2019): $23 billion total. GAO, “USDA Market Facilitation Program: Information on Payments for 2019.” https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-700r ↩

7. farmdoc daily, November 2025. 2016: 36.1 MMT; 2018: 8.2 MMT; 2024: 26.8 MMT; 2025 projected: ~18 MMT. https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/11/us-china-soybean-deal-comparing-past-export-levels-and-global-market-impacts.html; CNN, “Trump Signs First Stage China Trade Deal, Including Soybean Purchase Agreement,” January 15, 2020. Phase One deal included soybean commitments. https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/15/politics/us-china-trade-deal-phase-one-signed ↩

8. American Farm Bureau Federation, “China Phase ‘Two’: What We Know Right Now,” November 2025. Phase One target: $80 billion; actual: $60 billion. Agricultural exports to China declined from $41 billion (2022) to $27 billion (2024). https://www.fb.org/market-intel/china-phase-two-what-we-know-right-now ↩

9. The Daily Star (Bangladesh), “Soybean Imports from US Surge 310% in Sept-Dec,” January 2026. 754,681 tonnes imported. U.S. soybeans $10/ton cheaper than Brazilian alternatives. https://www.thedailystar.net/business/news/soybean-imports-us-surge-310-sept-dec-4066206 ↩