The Claim

Achieved record domestic oil and natural gas production following expanded leasing and permitting.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

Two things: (1) domestic oil and natural gas production reached record levels, and (2) this followed expanded leasing and permitting. The word “following” is performing critical work — it asserts temporal sequence while strongly implying causation without technically claiming it.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That expanded leasing and permitting caused the record production. That previous restrictions were suppressing production. That presidential energy policy is the primary driver of oil and gas output. That the causal chain runs: executive action on leasing/permitting leads to more drilling leads to more production leads to energy dominance.

What is conspicuously absent?

That US crude oil production has set records in four of the last five years — 2023, 2024, and 2025 all exceeded the prior Trump-era peak of 12.3 million barrels per day set in 2019. That Biden-era production grew from 11.3 million bpd (2021) to 13.2 million bpd (2024), adding nearly 2 million barrels per day. That the Biden administration approved more drilling permits in its first year than Trump’s first term did in the same period. That the US rig count declined through 2025 even as permit approvals surged — meaning companies were drilling less despite having more permission to drill. That oil executives consistently cite price, not permitting, as the primary driver of investment decisions. That production on federal lands represents only about 22-25% of total US oil production, with the vast majority occurring on state and private lands where federal leasing policy has no bearing. That the typical lag from lease sale to first production is 3-10 years, meaning production in 2025 reflects decisions made years earlier under previous administrations.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

US crude oil production averaged 13.59 million barrels per day in 2025, a record. ¹ EIA data shows annual average production rose from 13.24 million bpd in 2024 to 13.59 million bpd in 2025, an increase of approximately 350,000 bpd. The monthly peak was October 2025 at 13.86 million bpd. The 2025 annual average surpassed 2024 (13.24 million bpd), 2023 (12.94 million bpd), and the prior Trump-era peak of 12.32 million bpd in 2019. The claim of record crude oil production is factually correct.

US dry natural gas production averaged 107.7 billion cubic feet per day in 2025, a record. ² EIA Natural Gas Monthly data shows 2025 annual dry gas production at 107.7 Bcf/d, up 4.5% from 103.1 Bcf/d in 2024. December 2025 daily production of 111.6 Bcf/d was the highest for any month in the dataset (since 1973). The claim of record natural gas production is factually correct.

US crude oil production has set records under three consecutive administrations. ³ The production trajectory shows: Obama’s final year (2016) averaged 8.86 million bpd. Trump’s first-term peak (2019) reached 12.32 million bpd. Biden’s years saw production rise from 11.25 million bpd (2021) to 13.24 million bpd (2024) — an increase of nearly 2 million bpd. The 2025 record of 13.59 million bpd is an increment of 350,000 bpd over Biden’s 2024 level. Biden added roughly 5.7 times more production capacity than the 2024-2025 increment. The upward trajectory is a multi-administration trend driven primarily by the Permian Basin shale revolution that began under Obama.

Strong Inferences

The Biden administration approved more drilling permits in its first year than Trump’s first term did in the same period. ⁴ Per Item #325 analysis, the Center for Biological Diversity using BLM data found Biden approved 3,557 APDs in his first year versus 2,658 for Trump’s first year — a 34% higher rate under Biden. Over the first two years, Biden approved 6,430 permits compared to Trump’s 6,172. The narrative that Biden-era permitting suppressed production is contradicted by the permitting data itself.

The US rig count declined through 2025 even as permit approvals surged to record levels. ⁵ Baker Hughes data shows the average active US rig count fell from approximately 620 rigs at the start of 2024 to the low-to-mid-540 range by late 2025. Oil rigs specifically were down 33% from December 2022 levels to 397 in October 2025. This decline occurred during the same period when BLM approved a record 6,027 APDs — demonstrating that more permits did not translate into more drilling activity.

Federal lands account for roughly 22-25% of US crude oil production. ⁶ EIA data shows federal offshore production (Gulf of Mexico, primarily) at approximately 1.9 million bpd in 2025, or about 14% of total US production. Adding federal onshore production (estimated at 8-11% of the total based on historical ONRR data) brings the federal share to approximately 22-25%. The remaining 75-78% of US oil production occurs on state and private lands where federal leasing and permitting policy has no direct bearing on production decisions.

Oil prices, not permitting policy, are the primary driver of production decisions. ⁷ The Dallas Fed Energy Survey (Q1 2025) found that oil executives expected WTI at $68/barrel year-end 2025, with average breakeven prices of $65/barrel for new wells. In the Q4 2025 survey, executives were budgeting $59/barrel WTI for 2026 capital planning. One executive stated: “There cannot be ‘U.S. energy dominance’ and $50 per barrel oil; those two statements are contradictory.” Another noted that at sub-$50 prices, “U.S. oil production will start to decline immediately and likely significantly.” Respondents did not cite federal leasing or permitting as primary constraints; instead they focused on price uncertainty and tariff impacts on costs. The EIA’s own STEO states: “Higher oil prices lead to more U.S. crude oil production in our forecast.”

The typical lag from lease sale to first production is 3-10 years, making it impossible for 2025 leasing to produce 2025 oil. ⁸ The federal oil and gas development process involves multiple sequential stages: lease sale, environmental review, exploration, APD approval, well pad construction, drilling, completion, and tie-in to gathering infrastructure. The Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service have documented that this process typically takes 3-10 years from lease sale to first production, with shorter timescales for infill drilling on developed leases. Production in 2025 reflects investment decisions and lease acquisitions made during 2015-2022 — spanning the Obama, Trump first term, and Biden administrations. The word “following” in the claim implies a causal speed that the development timeline does not support.

Record production was achieved through efficiency gains despite fewer rigs, not because of more permits. ⁹ Per Item #325 analysis, Permian Basin oil production rose 18% while the rig count fell 29% from December 2022 levels. Operators achieved these gains by drilling longer lateral wells, focusing on the most productive acreage, and using advanced completion techniques. The EIA’s Drilling Productivity Report shows new-well production per rig has increased substantially across all major basins. The industry produced more oil with fewer rigs — a technology story, not a permitting story. EIA projects production to average 13.6 million bpd in 2026, essentially flat with 2025, despite the permitting surge.

What the Evidence Shows

The factual core of the claim is accurate: the United States did achieve record crude oil and natural gas production in 2025. These are real records confirmed by EIA data, and they matter — record domestic production contributed to a global supply surplus that helped lower energy prices for American consumers. This is good news regardless of the cause.

The word “following” is where the claim becomes misleading. It places two true facts next to each other — expanded permitting and record production — and invites the reader to infer that the first caused the second. But the evidence points to a different explanation. Production in 2025 reflects investment decisions made years earlier, during the Biden and first Trump administrations. The Permian Basin wells producing oil in 2025 were drilled on leases acquired in 2017-2022 using permits approved in 2020-2024. The 6,000 permits approved in 2025 will influence production in 2028-2032 — if companies choose to use them, which depends primarily on oil prices.

The rig count tells the real story. If expanded permitting were driving production, we would expect to see more rigs drilling. Instead, the rig count fell through 2025 while permits surged to a 15-year high. Companies had more permission to drill than ever and chose to drill less, because their investment decisions are governed by oil prices and investor expectations for capital returns — not by the number of permits in their filing cabinets. The Dallas Fed survey confirms this: executives cite price, capital efficiency, and returns as the variables that determine whether they drill.

The attribution problem is compounded by the fact that federal lands account for only about a quarter of US oil production. Three-quarters of the record output comes from state and private lands where federal leasing and permitting policy plays no role. The Permian Basin — the engine of US production growth — straddles federal and non-federal lands, but most of its recent growth has occurred on private acreage in Texas.

Natural gas production growth in 2025 is driven largely by associated gas — a byproduct of oil drilling, particularly in the Permian Basin. The EIA explicitly attributes gas production growth to “increased associated gas production from the Permian.” This means natural gas records are a secondary consequence of oil drilling economics, not an independent policy achievement.

The Bottom Line

The record production is real. The implied causation is not. US crude oil production at 13.59 million bpd and dry natural gas production at 107.7 Bcf/d in 2025 are genuine all-time records. But these records are the latest increment in a multi-administration upward trend driven by the shale revolution, Permian Basin geology, and private-sector technology gains. Production under Biden grew by nearly 2 million bpd; the 2024-to-2025 increment was 350,000 bpd. The word “following” does careful rhetorical work, placing expanded leasing and permitting before record production to imply causation where the evidence shows only sequence.

Steel-man: The administration’s permitting acceleration and regulatory rollbacks did reduce bureaucratic friction for federal land drilling, and the policy signal of support for fossil fuel development may have provided modest confidence to some operators. Over a multi-year horizon, the 6,000 permits approved and the reopened acreage may contribute to sustaining production levels. The administration did not obstruct the conditions that enabled record production. But the central drivers of 2025 output — global oil prices, Permian Basin geology, drilling efficiency gains, and investment decisions made under prior administrations — operated independently of the leasing and permitting changes made in 2025. The claim takes credit for a river that was already flowing.

Footnotes

1. EIA, “U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil” (monthly data through December 2025, released March 6, 2026). Annual average: 13,586 thousand bpd. Monthly peak: October 2025 at 13,864 thousand bpd. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=M. EIA, “U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil” (annual data). https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=A ↩

2. EIA Natural Gas Monthly (December 2025 data, released February 2026). Annual dry gas production: 107.7 Bcf/d (2025), up 4.5% from 103.1 Bcf/d (2024). December daily rate of 111.6 Bcf/d “the highest for any month since 1973.” https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/monthly/. EIA dry natural gas production data: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9070us2m.htm ↩

3. EIA annual crude oil production data. Trajectory: 2016: 8,857 thousand bpd; 2019: 12,315 thousand bpd; 2020: 11,336 thousand bpd; 2021: 11,311 thousand bpd; 2022: 12,004 thousand bpd; 2023: 12,943 thousand bpd; 2024: 13,235 thousand bpd; 2025: 13,586 thousand bpd. Biden-era increase (2021-2024): approximately 1,924 thousand bpd. 2024-2025 increment: approximately 351 thousand bpd. EIA, “Today in Energy: U.S. crude oil production reached record levels in 2023” (2024). https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61545 ↩

4. Per Item #325 analysis, citing Center for Biological Diversity analysis of BLM data and E&E News/Politico reporting. Biden first-year APDs: 3,557. Trump first-year APDs: 2,658. Biden first two years: 6,430. Trump first two years: 6,172. See Item #325 provenance for full sourcing. ↩

5. Baker Hughes rig count data. Per Item #325 analysis: average US rig count fell from approximately 620 (early 2024) to low-to-mid-540s (late 2025). Oil rigs down 33% from December 2022 to 397 (October 2025). Total rig count approximately 553 as of mid-March 2026. See Item #325 provenance for full sourcing. ↩

6. EIA, “U.S. Crude Oil Production by PAD District and State” (annual, released March 6, 2026). Federal offshore (PADD 3 + PADD 5): approximately 1,911 thousand bpd in 2025, or approximately 14.1% of total. Federal onshore estimated at 8-11% based on historical ONRR production data. Combined federal share approximately 22-25%. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm ↩

7. Dallas Fed Energy Survey, Q1 2025: executives expected WTI at $68/barrel year-end 2025; average breakeven for new wells $65/barrel. Q4 2025: executives budgeting $59/barrel WTI for 2026. Executive quote: “There cannot be ‘U.S. energy dominance’ and $50 per barrel oil.” Respondents did not cite federal leasing or permitting as primary constraints. https://www.dallasfed.org/research/surveys/des/2025/2501. https://www.dallasfed.org/research/surveys/des/2025/2504. EIA STEO (March 2026): “Higher oil prices lead to more U.S. crude oil production in our forecast.” https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/ ↩

8. The federal oil and gas development timeline (lease sale to production) is documented by the GAO, CRS, and BLM as typically spanning 3-10 years. The sequential stages include lease sale, environmental review, exploration, APD approval, well pad construction, drilling, completion, and infrastructure tie-in. Production in 2025 reflects decisions from the 2015-2022 period spanning three administrations. ↩

9. Per Item #325 analysis: Permian Basin oil production rose 18% while rig count fell 29% from December 2022. EIA Drilling Productivity Report shows increased new-well production per rig across all major basins. EIA STEO projects essentially flat production in 2026 (13.6 million bpd) despite record permitting. https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/. EIA STEO (March 2026): 2025 average 13.6 million bpd, 2026 forecast 13.6 million bpd. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/ ↩