The Claim

Cut red tape that accounted for 60% of the building and purchasing costs of new Department of Energy laboratories.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

That specific regulatory requirements (“red tape”) have been eliminated, and that those requirements were responsible for 60% of the cost of building and purchasing new DOE laboratory facilities.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That the administration has delivered a concrete, measurable 60% cost reduction on DOE laboratory construction. That regulatory compliance — rather than the inherent complexity of building nuclear-capable, security-classified research facilities — is the primary driver of construction costs. That this action is complete (“cut”), not merely announced.

What is conspicuously absent?

The source of the 60% figure. What specific regulations were “cut.” Whether any construction projects have actually been completed under the new rules, or whether this is a policy announcement with no demonstrated savings. That GAO identifies poor contractor project management — not regulatory oversight — as the primary driver of DOE construction cost overruns. That 53% of DOE’s existing project portfolio ($24+ billion) is already at risk of breaching cost baselines, and that reducing oversight may worsen rather than improve this problem.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

On March 27, 2025, Energy Secretary Chris Wright issued a Secretarial Order titled “Strengthening National Laboratory Efficiency and Mission Execution.” The order made four primary changes: (1) increased the delegated project authority threshold under DOE Order 413.3B from $50 million to $300 million for National Laboratories managed under Management & Operating (M&O) contracts; (2) limited DOE independent project reviews to specific critical decision points for projects between $300 million and $1 billion; (3) expanded the use of the OSHA-Plus safety framework for subcontracted construction projects; and (4) directed assessment of removing construction labor agreement provisions from contracts. Projects exceeding $1 billion continue to follow the full DOE Order 413.3B requirements. ¹

GAO has identified poor project management by contractors — not regulatory oversight — as the primary driver of DOE construction cost overruns. A February 2026 GAO assessment (GAO-26-107777) found that NNSA’s major construction cost overruns had grown from $2.1 billion in 2023 to $4.8 billion as of June 2025, with cumulative schedule delays growing from 9 years to 30 years. Root causes were “inadequate project management by NNSA’s management and operating contractors,” “poor performance by vendors or subcontractors,” and “increased costs of equipment, materials, or vendors.” The report does not identify DOE Order 413.3B oversight requirements as a cost driver. ²

53% of DOE’s total project portfolio — representing over $24 billion — was already at risk of breaching its performance baseline before the oversight reduction. Congressional appropriators cited this figure when requesting a GAO investigation into whether the Secretarial Order would increase the likelihood of cost overruns. The Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 alone saw cost estimates grow from $4.7 billion to $7.45 billion, with two UPF projects accounting for approximately 80% of cumulative NNSA cost overruns. ³

Strong Inferences

The 60% figure originates from anecdotal statements by lab directors to Wright, not from an independent audit or cost study. According to Fox News reporting, Wright “recounted a top issue from his meetings with laboratory leaders, who collectively said it can cost them 60% more to build or purchase a building than it does standard businesses located even just across the street.” This is the only sourced origin of the figure. DOE’s own press release does not mention 60%. No GAO report, Inspector General audit, or independent cost analysis has validated this number. ⁴

The White House claim materially distorts the original 60% figure. Lab directors reportedly said construction costs 60% MORE than private-sector equivalents nearby. The White House claim transforms this into “60% of the building and purchasing costs” — implying 60% of total costs are pure regulatory waste. These are mathematically distinct claims. If a lab building costs 60% more than a comparable private building, the regulatory premium would be roughly 37.5% of the total lab construction cost (60/160), not 60%. The White House version inflates the claimed regulatory burden by approximately 60%. ⁵

The comparison between DOE lab construction costs and nearby private businesses is misleading because it ignores the fundamental differences between the two. DOE national laboratories handle nuclear materials, classified information, and hazardous substances. They require specialized security infrastructure, containment systems, heavy shielding, and compliance with Atomic Energy Act requirements. These are not comparable to commercial office buildings “across the street.” A GAO-cited industry expert noted that costs can “quadruple to six-tuple if you’re inside the fence line versus outside” for nuclear facilities — suggesting the 60% premium may actually understate the legitimate cost differential for nuclear-capable facilities while overstating it for non-nuclear laboratory space. ⁶

The Secretarial Order has been announced but its effects are undemonstrated as of the claim date. The order was issued March 27, 2025. The “365 wins” list was published in January 2026, roughly nine months later. No DOE construction projects have been completed under the revised rules. The Los Alamos director estimated savings of “tens of millions of dollars” — a far more modest figure than 60% of construction costs would imply for major projects. No independent audit has confirmed any actual cost savings from the reforms. ⁷

Reducing oversight of projects up to $300 million may increase rather than decrease total costs. GAO’s decades of NNSA project assessments consistently find that cost overruns stem from insufficient oversight and poor early-stage project management, not from too much review. The oversight mechanisms in DOE Order 413.3B were established specifically in response to earlier construction failures. Removing independent reviews for projects up to $300 million eliminates the early-warning systems designed to catch exactly the management failures GAO has documented. ⁸

What the Evidence Shows

Something real happened here: Secretary Wright issued a Secretarial Order on March 27, 2025, that meaningfully changed DOE’s construction project oversight rules. The threshold for full DOE review was raised from $50 million to $300 million, which gives laboratory directors substantially more autonomy over mid-sized construction projects. Lab directors publicly supported the reforms and reported that existing processes were slow and costly. These are legitimate policy actions with real consequences.

But the claim that “red tape accounted for 60% of the building and purchasing costs” is a distortion stacked on an unsourced assertion. The 60% figure originates from lab directors’ informal complaints to Wright about costs being 60% higher than nearby private construction — an anecdotal comparison between nuclear-security-classified government facilities and commercial buildings, with no independent verification. The White House then transformed “costs 60% more” into “60% of costs are red tape,” which inflates the claim by roughly 60% through a mathematical sleight of hand. Even the original comparison is misleading: DOE labs handle nuclear materials, classified research, and hazardous substances that commercial buildings across the street simply do not.

The deeper irony is that GAO’s own assessments of DOE construction point to insufficient oversight and poor contractor management as the root causes of cost overruns — the very problems that reducing independent project reviews may exacerbate. With 53% of DOE’s $24+ billion project portfolio already at risk of breaching cost baselines, and NNSA cost overruns doubling from $2.1 billion to $4.8 billion in just two years, the timing of reducing oversight is particularly questionable.

The Bottom Line

The steel-man case: DOE laboratory construction genuinely involves layers of bureaucratic process that can add cost and delay, lab directors asked for relief, and the Secretarial Order represents a real response to those concerns. Some streamlining of project review for routine, non-nuclear laboratory construction may genuinely reduce costs.

But the claim that “red tape accounted for 60% of the building and purchasing costs” is misleading on multiple levels. The 60% figure comes from unsourced, anecdotal lab director complaints about a cost differential with incomparable private-sector buildings, not from any audit or study. The White House then inflated the figure by confusing “costs 60% more” with “60% of costs are waste” — a mathematically illiterate transformation that overstates the claimed regulatory burden. And GAO evidence consistently shows that DOE construction cost overruns are driven by poor project management, not by the oversight mechanisms being cut. The reforms are real; the framing is false.

Footnotes

1. DOE Press Release, “Secretary Wright Acts to Remove Red Tape, Accelerate Mission Execution at America’s National Weapons and Science Labs,” March 27, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-wright-acts-remove-red-tape-accelerate-mission-execution-americas-national ↩

2. GAO, “Nuclear Security Enterprise: Assessments of NNSA Major Projects” (GAO-26-107777), February 2026. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107777 ↩

3. Kaptur and Murray letter to GAO, April 2025; GAO-26-107777 on UPF cost growth. https://democrats-appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/kaptur-murray-ask-gao-look-whether-new-doe-order-will-risk-more-cost-overruns; https://www.enr.com/articles/62632-gao-finds-mounting-costs-years-long-delays-across-nnsa-nuclear-projects ↩

4. Fox News, “Energy chief slashes red tape that led to 60% cost in inflation, burdened work in ‘critical’ labs,” March 27, 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/energy-chief-slashes-red-tape-led-60-cost-inflation-burdened-work-critical-labs ↩

5. Mathematical analysis of the claim transformation. If a private building costs $100 and the lab building costs $160 (60% more), then the “red tape premium” is $60 out of $160 total, or 37.5% — not 60%. ↩

6. Engineering News-Record reporting on GAO-26-107777 findings; AIP FYI, “DOE Eases Regulation of National Labs.” https://www.enr.com/articles/62632-gao-finds-mounting-costs-years-long-delays-across-nnsa-nuclear-projects; https://www.aip.org/fyi/doe-eases-regulation-of-national-labs ↩

7. DOE, “ICYMI: DOE National Lab and Nuclear Weapons Directors Voice Support for Commonsense Permitting Reforms,” April 3, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/articles/icymi-doe-national-lab-and-nuclear-weapons-directors-voice-support-commonsense-permitting ↩

8. GAO-26-107777; Congressional appropriators’ letter to GAO; history of DOE Order 413.3B oversight framework. ↩