The Claim

Paused enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by executive order, reducing extraterritorial overreach that disadvantaged U.S. companies competing abroad.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

Two things: (1) that the administration paused FCPA enforcement via executive order, and (2) that this pause reduces “extraterritorial overreach” that put U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage abroad.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That the FCPA was unreasonably punishing American companies while their foreign competitors bribed freely. That pausing enforcement levels the playing field. That this is a pro-business, pro-worker measure. That “overreach” is the consensus view of FCPA enforcement. That American companies were the primary victims of FCPA enforcement. That bribery of foreign officials is simply a “routine business practice” in other countries. That the pause is a positive development for U.S. economic competitiveness.

What is conspicuously absent?

That the FCPA prohibits bribing foreign government officials — a law enacted after Watergate-era revelations of widespread corporate bribery. That nine of the top ten largest FCPA penalties were imposed on non-U.S. corporations, undermining the claim that enforcement “disadvantaged” American companies. That the pause resulted in approximately half of all open FCPA investigations being terminated, numerous cases dismissed, and four deferred prosecution agreements ended early. That the DOJ FCPA Unit lost one-third of its prosecutors (from 32 to 22). That the SEC brought zero FCPA enforcement actions in 2025 and effectively disbanded its FCPA unit. That FCPA enforcement generated $1.28 billion in penalties in 2024 alone, with foreign governments recovering an additional $400 million. That the UK Bribery Act, French Sapin II, and other international anti-corruption laws still apply to U.S. companies operating abroad — meaning the “competitive disadvantage” argument applies only to countries with no anti-corruption enforcement. That the pause was followed by the U.S. missing the March 2025 OECD bribery working group and losing its seat at the table as the UK, France, and Switzerland formed an International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Task Force without the United States. That compliance professionals reported increased bribe solicitations from foreign officials after the pause took effect. That the administration simultaneously reversed sanctions on corrupt foreign officials in Paraguay, Hungary, and the Western Balkans.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

The executive order was signed on February 10, 2025, directing a 180-day pause on all new FCPA investigations and enforcement actions. The order directed Attorney General Pamela Bondi to cease initiating any new FCPA investigations, review all existing investigations, and issue updated enforcement guidelines. The pause could be extended an additional 180 days. All future FCPA investigations, even after the pause, would require specific Attorney General authorization. The order also directed the AG to determine whether “inappropriate past FCPA investigation and enforcement actions” warranted remedial measures, potentially opening the door to reversing prior settlements. [^120-a1]

The pause resulted in approximately half of all open DOJ FCPA investigations being terminated. During the review period, DOJ closed investigations into PetroNor E&P, Digicel, Bombardier (Azerbaijan and Indonesia), Stryker Corporation, Toyota, GE Healthcare Technologies, Calavo Growers, and others. Criminal charges against Cognizant Technology Solutions executives Gordon Coburn and Steven Schwartz were dismissed with prejudice in April 2025. Four deferred prosecution agreements (Stericycle, ABB, Honeywell, GOL Linhas Aereas) and one non-prosecution agreement (Albemarle) were terminated early. The Glencore International monitorship was ended 15 months ahead of schedule. [^120-a2]

DOJ resolved only two corporate FCPA cases in all of 2025, collecting approximately $123 million — an 89% decline from 2024. The two resolutions were Liberty Mutual ($4.7 million declination with disgorgement, August 2025) and TIGO Guatemala ($118 million DPA, November 2025). By comparison, DOJ resolved nine corporate FCPA cases in 2024 for approximately $1.09 billion, and eight in 2023 for approximately $459 million. The SEC brought zero FCPA enforcement actions in 2025, and its specialized FCPA unit was effectively disbanded when its chief (Charles Cain, serving since 2017) and deputy chief (Tracy Price, since 2018) departed in April 2025. [^120-a3]

Nine of the ten largest FCPA penalties in history were imposed on non-U.S. corporations. The FCPA’s extraterritorial reach has been applied more aggressively against foreign competitors — including Siemens (Germany), Airbus (France/Netherlands), Ericsson (Sweden), Telia (Sweden), and Petrobras-related entities (Brazil) — than against American companies. The claim that FCPA enforcement “disadvantaged U.S. companies competing abroad” is directly contradicted by the enforcement record, which shows the law was more frequently used to penalize the foreign competitors the administration claims to be protecting American companies from. [^120-a5]

FCPA enforcement generated $1.28 billion in U.S. government penalties in 2024, with foreign governments recovering an additional $400 million in related settlements. The FCPA has been one of the most financially productive enforcement tools in the DOJ’s arsenal. Historical peaks include approximately $2.9 billion in 2018-2019 and over $2.7 billion in 2020. Since 1977, the law has generated tens of billions of dollars in penalties and disgorgement. [^120-a6]

Strong Inferences

The DOJ FCPA Unit’s prosecutor headcount declined from 32 in 2024 to 22 in 2025 — a one-third reduction. Departing prosecutors were reassigned to other DOJ units including Bank Integrity, Market/Government/Consumer Fraud, and Healthcare Fraud. Unit Chief David Fuhr remained in position. The new Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Andrew Tysen Duva (confirmed December 2025), stated publicly that “FCPA enforcement has extended beyond its original intent, burdening American companies.” [^120-a4]

The “competitive disadvantage” framing is undermined by the existence of parallel anti-corruption laws in every major competitor nation. The UK Bribery Act (2010) has extensive extraterritorial reach and applies to any company carrying on business in the UK. The French Sapin II law (2016) similarly applies extraterritorially. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, signed by 44 countries including all major U.S. trading partners, requires signatories to criminalize bribery of foreign officials. In 2025, the UK, France, and Switzerland formed an International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Task Force — without U.S. participation. The argument that FCPA enforcement creates an “uneven playing field” holds only for competition with companies from countries that have no anti-corruption framework — i.e., the most corrupt markets in the world. The Harvard Law School Forum analysis noted that even with the DOJ pause, U.S. companies remain subject to prosecution under UK, French, and emerging EU anti-corruption laws for overseas bribery. [^120-a7]

The pause coincided with the administration reversing sanctions on corrupt foreign officials, suggesting a broader de-prioritization of anti-corruption rather than a targeted FCPA reform. In 2025, the administration reversed sanctions on former Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s aide Antal Rogan, and Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik along with 47 others in the Western Balkans — all individuals sanctioned for corruption under prior administrations. The U.S. Coordinator on Global Anti-Corruption position, created in 2022, was eliminated. The U.S. reduced participation in OECD anti-corruption forums. Richard Nephew, the inaugural occupant of that coordinator position, concluded that “across every measurable dimension…the United States has drawn down its anti-corruption posture.” [^120-a8]

The June 2025 “resumption” guidelines effectively narrowed FCPA enforcement to a subset of cases that serve the administration’s political priorities rather than the statute’s original anti-bribery purpose. DAG Todd Blanche’s June 9, 2025 guidelines made cartel/TCO connections a “primary consideration,” required senior-level authorization for every investigation, instructed prosecutors to avoid prosecuting “routine business practices” or “de minimis business courtesies,” and directed them to “limit undue burdens on American companies.” The guidelines also shifted emphasis from corporate liability to individual liability — a change that, in practice, makes FCPA cases harder to bring because proving individual corrupt intent is more difficult than proving corporate responsibility through organizational failures. Only five individuals were newly charged with FCPA or related offenses in 2025 — the fewest since 2012. [^120-a9]

Compliance professionals reported anecdotally that bribe solicitations from foreign officials increased after the pause took effect. While this evidence is anecdotal and unquantifiable, it aligns with the predictable incentive structure: when the world’s most aggressive FCPA enforcer signals it will not prosecute foreign bribery, foreign officials who extract bribes face reduced risk. Transparency International warned the pause “will work to the advantage of unscrupulous business actors around the world who until now feared U.S. criminal pursuits.” [^120-a10]

What the Evidence Shows

The factual core of this claim is true: the administration did sign an executive order on February 10, 2025 pausing FCPA enforcement, and the pause was real and consequential. But the framing — that this reduces “extraterritorial overreach” that “disadvantaged U.S. companies” — inverts the actual record.

The FCPA’s enforcement history shows it was used far more aggressively against foreign corporations than against American ones. Nine of the ten largest penalties went to non-U.S. companies. In practice, the FCPA served as a tool to penalize foreign competitors who gained market share through corruption — exactly the kind of “leveling the playing field” the executive order claims to pursue. Pausing enforcement removes one of the few mechanisms that protected American companies from being outbid by bribery.

The consequences of the pause were severe and measurable across every dimension of anti-corruption enforcement. Half of open investigations were terminated. DOJ corporate resolutions fell 89% by dollar amount. The SEC FCPA unit was disbanded. The DOJ’s FCPA prosecutor corps was cut by one-third. The United States missed OECD anti-corruption meetings, lost its seat at the newly formed international prosecutorial task force, and reversed sanctions on corrupt officials in three regions. The administration did not “pause” FCPA enforcement — it dismantled the enforcement infrastructure.

The “competitive disadvantage” argument also ignores a critical structural reality: the UK Bribery Act, French Sapin II, and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention still apply to U.S. companies operating abroad. American firms cannot simply begin bribing foreign officials without legal risk, because other nations’ anti-corruption laws have extraterritorial reach. The only scenario in which the FCPA pause creates a genuine competitive “advantage” is in markets where no country enforces anti-corruption law — that is, the most corrupt environments on earth. This is the competitive environment the administration has optimized for.

The June 2025 guidelines, while nominally “resuming” enforcement, narrowed the scope of FCPA enforcement to cases connected to cartels, national security, or economic competitiveness — categories that serve the administration’s political priorities rather than the statute’s purpose of preventing corruption. The requirement that every investigation receive senior-level authorization creates a political bottleneck that effectively gives the executive branch veto power over individual FCPA cases, a departure from the traditional prosecutorial independence that defined the program.

The Bottom Line

The claim is factually accurate in its narrowest reading: the administration did pause FCPA enforcement by executive order. But calling this a reduction in “extraterritorial overreach that disadvantaged U.S. companies” is misleading in nearly every dimension. The FCPA was used more aggressively against foreign competitors than American companies. The pause resulted in half of open investigations being terminated, an 89% drop in penalties, the disbanding of the SEC’s FCPA unit, and the loss of U.S. leadership in international anti-corruption cooperation. The “competitive disadvantage” framing ignores that other nations’ anti-corruption laws still apply to U.S. companies, and that FCPA enforcement generated billions of dollars in penalties from foreign corporations. What the administration describes as protecting American competitiveness, the enforcement record reveals as the dismantling of the world’s most effective anti-corruption enforcement apparatus — benefiting the most corrupt market participants while removing a tool that helped honest American companies compete on merit.