The Claim

Launched USDA’s National Farm Security Action Plan, treating food and agriculture as national security and hardening the supply chain against foreign threats.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

Three things: (1) The USDA launched a specific policy called the “National Farm Security Action Plan.” (2) This plan treats food and agriculture as matters of national security. (3) The plan hardens the supply chain against foreign threats.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That this represents a major substantive policy shift with real-world consequences for agricultural security. That the administration identified and addressed a genuine foreign threat to America’s food supply. That “hardening the supply chain” means concrete defensive measures have been implemented — new rules, enforcement actions, blocked transactions, or structural changes to agricultural infrastructure. The martial framing (“security,” “hardening,” “threats”) implies urgency and decisive action.

What is conspicuously absent?

Any description of what the plan actually does. Any mention that as of January 2026, the plan’s most consequential proposals — ending foreign adversary ownership of U.S. farmland, adding the Agriculture Secretary permanently to CFIUS — remain unimplemented or in the earliest stages of rulemaking. Any acknowledgment that foreign entities own only 3.6% of U.S. farmland and Chinese entities own less than 1%, meaning the “threat” being addressed is vanishingly small relative to the rhetoric. Any mention that the only concrete regulatory action — updating AFIDA reporting requirements — implements a mandate from a 2023 law signed by President Biden. Any mention that the Biden administration’s own NSM-16 already designated food and agriculture as critical national security infrastructure in 2022 — and that the Trump administration’s first relevant executive order (March 2025) directed a review of NSM-16 for potential revocation. Any acknowledgment that the administration’s own tariff policies have done more to disrupt American agricultural supply chains than any foreign adversary: Chinese retaliatory tariffs collapsed soybean exports by 53%, Canadian retaliatory tariffs hit $30 billion in agricultural goods, and the administration paid $12 billion in emergency farmer bailouts to compensate for these self-inflicted disruptions.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

The USDA announced the National Farm Security Action Plan on July 8, 2025. Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins unveiled a seven-point plan at an event in Washington D.C. attended by cabinet members, Congressional lawmakers, and governors. The plan aims to protect American farmland and the food supply from foreign control, with a particular focus on adversary nations including China. ¹

The only concrete regulatory action by January 2026 was an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to update AFIDA reporting requirements — implementing a mandate from a 2023 Biden-era law. On December 29, 2025, the USDA published an ANPRM (document 2025-23830, 90 FR 60581) to revise AFIDA regulations that had been unchanged since 2006. The notice responds to GAO-identified deficiencies in data collection and implements electronic submission requirements mandated by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 — signed by President Biden. An ANPRM is the earliest stage of the rulemaking process, soliciting general public input before a formal proposed rule is drafted. Finalization typically requires additional notice-and-comment periods and can take years. ²

Strong Inferences

The plan proposed adding the Agriculture Secretary to CFIUS through executive action. House Agriculture Committee Chairman G.T. Thompson confirmed that through executive action, Secretary Rollins would be added to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States — the interagency body that reviews foreign investments for national security threats. Thompson noted that making this permanent would require Congressional legislation through the farm bill. No such legislation has been enacted as of January 2026. ³

The plan’s centerpiece — ending foreign adversary ownership of U.S. farmland — remained “to be determined” months after announcement. When asked about the impact on hog producers contracting with Chinese-owned Smithfield Foods (which holds 85,000 acres of U.S. farmland through parent company WH Group), Secretary Rollins stated: “The question of foreign owned ag assets and foreign owned ag land is a serious, serious question. It’s not one we will answer today, next week or a month.” She acknowledged: “none of these are easy questions. These are very difficult questions.” An anticipated executive order on foreign farmland ownership had not been issued as of January 2026. ⁴

Foreign entities own approximately 3.6% of U.S. farmland, with Chinese entities owning less than 1%. According to USDA data reported alongside the plan’s announcement, the foreign ownership “threat” the plan addresses involves a small fraction of total U.S. agricultural land. Chinese-owned farmland — the primary target of the plan’s rhetoric — represents less than one percent of U.S. agricultural land. ⁵

The Biden administration had already designated food and agriculture as a national security matter through NSM-16. National Security Memorandum 16, “Strengthening the Security and Resilience of United States Food and Agriculture,” was signed on November 10, 2022. It specifically treated the food and agriculture sector as critical national security infrastructure. The Trump administration’s March 2025 executive order “Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness” directed a review of NSM-16 within 180 days for potential “revisions, recissions, and replacements” — meaning the administration’s initial action was to potentially undo existing food security policy, not to create new protections. ⁶

A USDA-Department of Defense MOU was signed on February 11, 2026, advancing the plan. Secretary Rollins and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth signed a memorandum of understanding to advance collaboration between the two departments on agricultural security. This occurred more than seven months after the plan’s announcement and after the January 20, 2026 claim date. ⁷

The plan’s most consequential target — Smithfield Foods/WH Group — illustrates the gap between rhetoric and action. WH Group’s 2013 acquisition of Smithfield Foods for $4.7 billion was approved by CFIUS under the Obama administration. Smithfield is the world’s largest pork producer and owns 85,000 acres of U.S. farmland. Any forced divestiture would be the most significant CFIUS-related action in agricultural history, would face massive legal challenges, and would disrupt the livelihoods of thousands of contract hog farmers. Secretary Rollins’ acknowledgment that these are “very difficult questions” with no timeline for answers suggests the administration is unlikely to take the most impactful action the plan implies. ⁸

The administration’s own tariff policies have done more to disrupt U.S. agricultural supply chains than any foreign adversary. While the plan frames foreign threats as the primary supply chain risk, the administration’s tariff escalation triggered Chinese retaliatory tariffs that collapsed soybean exports by 53%, Canadian retaliatory tariffs hitting $30 billion in U.S. agricultural goods, and fertilizer tariff increases of 16-39%. The administration paid $12 billion in emergency “Farmer Bridge” payments in December 2025 to compensate farmers for these disruptions. This is the second cycle: the first-term trade war cost $23 billion in farmer bailouts and permanently ceded 20% of U.S. soybean market share to Brazil. The plan addresses a hypothetical foreign threat to supply chains while ignoring an ongoing, demonstrable, self-inflicted one. ⁹

The plan functions primarily as a messaging framework rather than a policy with binding force. Absent an executive order, legislation, or finalized regulation, the seven-point plan has no legal mechanism to compel action. The AFIDA ANPRM is in the earliest stage of rulemaking. The CFIUS addition has not been codified in legislation. No foreign farmland transactions have been blocked. No existing foreign ownership has been reversed. The USDA-DoD MOU was signed after the claim date. The plan’s rhetorical framing — “national security,” “hardening,” “foreign threats” — far exceeds its operational substance as of the claim date. ¹⁰

What the Evidence Shows

The National Farm Security Action Plan is real. Secretary Rollins announced it on July 8, 2025, with a seven-point framework to protect American agriculture from foreign adversary influence. The framing of food and agriculture as national security matters is genuine and has bipartisan support — House Agriculture Committee Chairman Thompson endorsed it, Nebraska Governor Pillen praised its alignment with state-level restrictions, and the concept of agricultural security has deep roots in U.S. policy (the Biden administration’s NSM-16 formalized the same principle in 2022).

But the claim’s language — “launched,” “hardening the supply chain” — implies operational substance that does not exist as of the claim date. The plan’s most consequential proposals remain unimplemented. No executive order on foreign farmland ownership has been issued. The CFIUS addition has not been codified. The only concrete regulatory action in the Federal Register — updating AFIDA reporting requirements — is an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the earliest possible stage of rulemaking, and it primarily implements a mandate from a 2023 law signed by President Biden. The USDA-DoD memorandum of understanding was signed three weeks after the claim was published.

The plan also operates in a context that undermines its own premise. While it frames foreign adversaries as the primary threat to U.S. agricultural supply chains, the administration’s tariff policies have inflicted more damage on those supply chains than any foreign land purchase. Chinese retaliatory tariffs collapsed soybean exports by 53%. Canadian tariffs hit $30 billion in agricultural goods. Input costs for farmers rose 16-39% from tariffs on imported fertilizer. The administration paid $12 billion in emergency farmer bailouts to compensate for these self-inflicted disruptions — the second such bailout in two Trump terms, with a combined taxpayer cost of approximately $35 billion. Foreign entities own 3.6% of U.S. farmland; Chinese entities own less than 1%. The actual, demonstrated, ongoing threats to American agricultural supply chains come not from foreign land purchases but from the administration’s own trade policy.

The Bottom Line

The USDA did announce the National Farm Security Action Plan on July 8, 2025, and the conceptual framing of agriculture as a national security matter is legitimate — indeed, the Biden administration had already formalized it through NSM-16 in 2022. To that extent, the core factual claim holds up. But describing the plan as “hardening the supply chain against foreign threats” dramatically overstates what had been accomplished by the claim date. The plan’s most consequential proposals — ending foreign adversary farmland ownership, permanently adding the Agriculture Secretary to CFIUS — remain unimplemented. The only concrete regulatory action in the Federal Register implements a Biden-era legislative mandate and is in the earliest stage of rulemaking. Foreign entities own 3.6% of U.S. farmland; Chinese entities own less than 1%. Meanwhile, the administration’s own tariff policies have demonstrably disrupted agricultural supply chains, collapsed export markets, and required $12 billion in emergency farmer bailouts — a far more substantial and immediate threat to U.S. food security than the foreign land purchases the plan targets. The plan was launched in the sense that it was announced. It has not been launched in the sense that it has hardened anything.

Sources

Footnotes

1. Brownfield Ag News, “USDA Announces National Farm Security Action Plan,” July 8, 2025. Seven-point plan announced by Secretary Rollins. https://www.brownfieldagnews.com/news/usda-announces-national-farm-security-action-plan/ ↩

2. Federal Register, “Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act: Revisions to Reporting Requirements,” 2025-23830, 90 FR 60581, December 29, 2025. ANPRM. GAO deficiencies. Electronic submission per 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/29/2025-23830/agricultural-foreign-investment-disclosure-act-revisions-to-reporting-requirements; Federal Register, “Information Collection Request; Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act,” 2025-09831, May 30, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/30/2025-09831/information-collection-request-agricultural-foreign-investment-disclosure-act ↩

3. Brownfield Ag News, “Thompson: Food Security Is National Security,” July 9, 2025. CFIUS addition through executive action; Congressional codification needed. https://www.brownfieldagnews.com/news/thompson-foreign-ag-land-to-be-addressed-in-farm-bill-2-0/ ↩

4. Brownfield Ag News, “TBD: USDA’s National Farm Security Action Plan Impact on Hog Farmers,” July 17, 2025. Rollins: “very difficult questions.” Anticipated EO not issued. Smithfield/WH Group: 85,000 acres. https://www.brownfieldagnews.com/news/tbd-usdas-national-farm-security-action-plan-impact-on-hog-farmers/ ↩

5. Brownfield Ag News, “Pillen Says USDA Plan Safeguards Ag Industry,” July 9, 2025. USDA data: foreign entities own 3.6% of farmland; China less than 1%. https://www.brownfieldagnews.com/news/pillen-says-usda-plan-safeguards-ag-industry/ ↩

6. White House, “Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness,” Executive Order, March 19, 2025. Section 3(b): NSM-16 listed for review for “revisions, recissions, and replacements” within 180 days. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/achieving-efficiency-through-state-and-local-preparedness/ ↩

7. Brownfield Ag News, “Rollins, Hegseth Sign MOU Advancing National Farm Security Action Plan,” February 11, 2026. USDA-DoD MOU signed. https://www.brownfieldagnews.com/news/rollins-hegseth-sign-mou-advancing-national-farm-security-action-plan/ ↩

8. Brownfield Ag News (July 17, 2025, ibid.). Smithfield/WH Group $4.7B acquisition (2013). CFIUS approved under Obama. 85,000 acres. “one-one hundredth of one percent of American farmland.” No divestiture action as of January 2026. ↩

9. See Item #94 analysis (USDA Farmer Bridge Assistance, $12 billion) and Item #95 analysis (soybean trade war). CSIS, “When a Trade War Becomes a Food Fight”: agricultural exports to China down $6.8B (73%). Soybean exports down 53%. Fertilizer costs up 16-39%. Canada 25% retaliatory tariffs on $30B in agricultural goods. https://www.csis.org/analysis/when-trade-war-becomes-food-fight ↩

10. Federal Register search: zero results for “National Farm Security Action Plan.” AFIDA ANPRM (2025-23830) is the sole relevant rulemaking action. No executive order on foreign farmland ownership published. CFIUS membership unchanged in legislation. Farm bill not enacted. ↩