The Claim

Restored maximum pressure on Iran.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

That the Trump administration reinstated its “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against Iran. “Restored” implies both a return to the first-term policy framework and a meaningful change from the Biden administration’s approach.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That maximum pressure is working — that Iran’s economy is being effectively strangled, its oil revenues cut off, and its regime forced toward capitulation or collapse. That the Biden administration had abandoned maximum pressure entirely. That the reimposition of sanctions has meaningfully constrained Iran’s ability to fund its nuclear program and regional proxy networks. That the policy represents a coherent, sustained strategy rather than a series of reactive escalations.

What is conspicuously absent?

Any metric of effectiveness. During the first Trump term, maximum pressure drove Iran’s oil exports below 500,000 barrels per day by late 2019. In 2025, Iran exported an average of 1.7-1.8 million barrels per day — roughly four times the first-term low. The claim says nothing about the October 2025 peak when exports hit 2.15-2.3 million bpd, a seven-year high. It omits the president’s own June 2025 offer to allow China to buy Iranian oil, which he reversed days later. It omits that maximum pressure policy was briefly interrupted by a military campaign (Operation Midnight Hammer) and a brief ceasefire diplomacy phase — neither of which fits the “steady pressure” narrative. And it omits the fundamental structural challenge: China’s refusal to cooperate with U.S. secondary sanctions means the primary buyer of Iranian oil remains effectively beyond reach.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

President Trump signed NSPM-2 on February 4, 2025, formally restoring the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. The memorandum directed the Secretary of the Treasury to impose maximum economic pressure, the Secretary of State to rescind existing sanctions waivers and drive oil exports to zero, and the U.S. UN Representative to pursue snapback of international sanctions. It explicitly aimed to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and counter its “malign influence abroad.” ¹

OFAC designated over 875 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft in 2025 as part of the maximum pressure campaign. The Treasury Department’s actions included sanctioning three Chinese “teapot” refineries in Shandong Province — Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical (March 2025), Shengxing Chemical (April 2025), and Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group (May 2025) — for collectively purchasing billions of dollars of Iranian crude. OFAC also targeted shadow fleet vessels, shadow banking networks (including the Zarringhalam brothers’ network spanning China, Hong Kong, and the UAE), and digital asset exchanges processing IRGC-linked funds. ²

Iran’s oil exports in 2025 averaged approximately 1.7-1.8 million barrels per day — roughly four times the 2020 low of 404,000 bpd achieved during the first-term maximum pressure campaign. Tanker tracking data from UANI showed exports peaking in October 2025 at approximately 2.15-2.3 million bpd, a seven-year high. In November, UANI tracked 61.3 million barrels (2.04 million bpd), with 89% going to China. Estimated gross revenue was approximately $60 billion for the year. ³

The UN snapback mechanism was triggered on August 28, 2025, by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, reimposing international sanctions on September 27, 2025. The E3 cited Iran’s “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments. China and Russia contested the legal standing of the snapback invocation, arguing sanctions were permanently lifted when Resolution 2231 was originally set to expire on October 18, 2025. ⁴

Iran’s economy deteriorated severely in 2025. The IMF projected GDP growth of just 0.6% (down from 3.7% in 2024), inflation of 43.3%, and unemployment rising from 7.7% to 9.5%. The rial collapsed from approximately 600,000 per dollar in early 2025 to 1.75 million per dollar by December 2025, making it the world’s least valuable currency. Food price inflation reached 72%. Nominal GDP fell from $401 billion to $341 billion. ⁵

The Biden administration maintained all Trump-era Iran sanctions on the books but relaxed enforcement, particularly regarding oil exports to China. Iran’s oil exports to China quadrupled between 2019 and 2023, from 308,000 bpd to 1.2 million bpd. Revenue from oil exports nearly quadrupled from $16 billion in 2020 to $53 billion in 2023. Neither administration achieved the stated goal of zero Iranian oil exports. ⁶

Strong Inferences

The primary constraint on maximum pressure effectiveness is China’s continued willingness to purchase Iranian crude, which the U.S. has been unable or unwilling to fully address. Although three Chinese teapot refineries were sanctioned in 2025 (causing five other Shandong refineries to temporarily halt Iranian crude purchases), the overall flow was barely disrupted. China bought 87% of Iran’s crude exports in 2025. The sanctioned refineries represented a small fraction of total Chinese purchases. Hundreds of non-sanctioned vessels continue transporting Iranian oil through opaque trading routes. The structural reality is that sanctioning a few Chinese refineries while maintaining a broader trade relationship with China creates an inherent ceiling on enforcement. ⁷

The June 2025 policy oscillation — offering sanctions relief then abruptly withdrawing it — undermined the credibility of “maximum pressure” as a coherent strategy. After the ceasefire ending the Twelve-Day War (June 24, 2025), Trump posted on Truth Social that “China can now continue to purchase Oil from Iran.” Days later, after Supreme Leader Khamenei claimed victory and declared Iran had dealt the U.S. a “slap in the face,” Trump reversed course, saying he had “immediately dropped all work on sanction relief.” This whiplash — from maximum pressure to sanctions relief and back within a week — suggests the policy is more reactive than strategic. ⁸

Iran’s economic deterioration in 2025 reflects a combination of U.S. sanctions, structural mismanagement, and the consequences of the Twelve-Day War — not sanctions alone. The rial’s collapse accelerated after the June 2025 military conflict. Domestic factors including energy shortages, corruption, and fiscal mismanagement contributed to Iran’s economic crisis independently of sanctions. The IMF noted Iran’s oil exports averaged 1.1 million bpd on a revenue basis (after discounts and evasion costs), far below the gross export volume, suggesting sanctions impose significant friction costs even when they do not stop exports. ⁹

The escalation to military strikes (Operation Midnight Hammer, June 22, 2025; second round of strikes, March 1-3, 2026) represents a tacit admission that sanctions alone were not achieving their stated objective of denying Iran nuclear capability. The NSPM-2 directed a policy of economic pressure to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon. Within five months, the U.S. resorted to B-2 bomber strikes on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. This sequence suggests the administration concluded that “maximum pressure” as an economic strategy was insufficient, requiring military action. ¹⁰

What the Evidence Shows

The factual core of this claim is straightforward: the Trump administration did formally restore the maximum pressure framework on February 4, 2025, via NSPM-2. The executive machinery was activated — hundreds of designations were issued, Chinese refineries were sanctioned for the first time, shadow fleet vessels were targeted, and the UN snapback mechanism was successfully triggered. Iran’s economy is genuinely suffering, with the rial in freefall and inflation exceeding 43%. These are real policy actions with real consequences.

But the word “restored” implies a return to first-term levels of pressure — and by the most important metric, oil export volumes, the second-term campaign has fallen dramatically short. At the peak of first-term enforcement in 2020, Iran’s exports were below 500,000 bpd. In 2025, they averaged 1.7-1.8 million bpd and peaked above 2 million bpd. The stated goal of driving exports to zero remains as distant as ever. The fundamental obstacle — China’s willingness to absorb discounted Iranian crude through an elaborate shadow fleet infrastructure — has only deepened since the first term. The sanctioning of three teapot refineries, while symbolically significant, affected a fraction of the trade.

The policy’s coherence is further complicated by the Twelve-Day War and its aftermath. The administration oscillated from maximum pressure to sanctions relief to military strikes to renewed maximum pressure within months, suggesting the “restored” framing papers over a far more chaotic reality. The February 2026 executive order authorizing tariffs on countries that trade with Iran represents a further escalation — but also an admission that existing sanctions were not working as intended.

Iran’s economic pain is real, but its causes are multifactorial. Sanctions impose friction costs and contribute to rial depreciation, but decades of state mismanagement, the fiscal burden of proxy wars, and the direct economic shock of the June 2025 military conflict are independent contributing factors. Attribution of Iran’s economic distress solely to “maximum pressure” overstates what the sanctions alone have achieved.

It is also worth noting what “maximum pressure” has escalated into. As of March 2026, the United States is engaged in a full-scale military conflict with Iran — Operation Midnight Hammer (June 2025), the Twelve-Day War, Operation Epic Fury (February-March 2026), the killing of Supreme Leader Khamenei, over 1,200 Iranian civilians dead, 13 U.S. service members killed, and $16.5 billion spent — with no congressional authorization, no diplomatic off-ramp, and no end in sight. The trajectory from sanctions policy to active warfare happened in under five months. Whatever “maximum pressure” is now, it bears little resemblance to the economic coercion framework the term describes. (See item #151 for the full analysis of the military campaign and item #142 for the Twelve-Day War.)

The Bottom Line

The claim is literally true: the Trump administration did formally restore the maximum pressure sanctions framework on Iran. Credit is due for taking concrete enforcement actions that the Biden administration avoided, including sanctioning Chinese refineries for the first time and supporting the UN snapback mechanism. Iran’s economy is in genuine crisis, and U.S. sanctions are a contributing factor.

But “restored” implies the policy is working at first-term levels — and by the administration’s own primary metric (oil export volumes), it is not even close. Iran exported roughly four times as much oil in 2025 as it did at the peak of first-term enforcement, generating an estimated $60 billion in revenue. The policy oscillated from maximum pressure to sanctions relief to military strikes to the killing of a head of state — less a coherent “maximum pressure” campaign than an escalation spiral that has crossed from economic coercion into active warfare. The claim’s use of “maximum pressure” — a term that denotes sanctions, not bombs — to describe a policy that now includes B-2 strikes on sovereign territory, regime decapitation, and an ongoing military campaign without congressional authorization is not imprecise language. It is a misdescription of what is actually happening. The structural challenge of Chinese non-compliance remains the elephant in the room that no amount of executive orders can address without a willingness to impose genuinely painful secondary sanctions on Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises — something the administration has not done.

Footnotes

1. White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restores Maximum Pressure on Iran,” February 4, 2025; NSPM-2 text. ↩

2. Treasury press releases sb0090 (April 16, 2025), sb0322, sb0405; State Department release on third teapot designation (May 2025); OFAC Iran sanctions program page. ↩

3. UANI Iran Tanker Tracker (November 2025, October 2025); FDD analysis of October 2025 exports; Iran International year-end energy trade review (January 22, 2026). ↩

4. UN Security Council Resolution 2231 snapback mechanism; EU Council press release (September 29, 2025); UN Security Council meeting coverage. ↩

5. IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2025) Iran data; Iran International economic reporting (December 28, 2025); PBS and CNN reporting on rial collapse (December 2025). ↩

6. CRS report IF12952, “Iran’s Petroleum Exports to China and U.S. Sanctions”; FDD analysis of Biden-era enforcement (September 2023); UANI analysis of Trump vs. Biden oil sales. ↩

7. CRS report IF12952; Iran International year-end energy review; UANI November 2025 data showing 89% of crude exports to China. ↩

8. Axios, “Trump Suspends Iran Sanctions Relief After Khamenei Speech” (June 27, 2025); Foreign Policy, “Did Trump Just Lift Sanctions on Iran’s Oil Exports?” (June 26, 2025). ↩

9. IMF October 2025 WEO; World Bank Iran economic brief; Iran International economic reporting. ↩

10. NSPM-2 stated objective of denying Iran all paths to nuclear weapons; Operation Midnight Hammer (June 22, 2025); 2026 US-Israel strikes on Iran (March 1-3, 2026); CRS report on Israel-Iran Conflict (IF13032). ↩