The Claim

Achieved a ceasefire with Houthi terrorists in Yemen, restoring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea for U.S.-flagged ships.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

Two distinct factual claims: (1) that the Trump administration achieved a ceasefire with the Houthis in Yemen, and (2) that this ceasefire restored freedom of navigation in the Red Sea for U.S.-flagged ships.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That Trump resolved the Red Sea shipping crisis. That the ceasefire is durable and significant. That the Red Sea is safe for commerce again. The word “achieved” implies a diplomatic victory rather than a mutual standoff. By specifying “U.S.-flagged ships,” the claim technically narrows its own scope — but in context, placed under the “REASSERTING AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ON THE WORLD STAGE” heading, it implies that Red Sea navigation is broadly restored as a result of American leadership.

What is conspicuously absent?

That the ceasefire explicitly excluded Israel-linked shipping. That the Houthis violated it within two months by sinking the MV Magic Seas and attacking the MV Eternity C, killing at least seven mariners. That the ceasefire followed a $2+ billion bombing campaign (Operation Rough Rider) that killed at least 224 civilians without achieving air superiority over the Houthis. That U.S.-flagged ships represent a tiny fraction of global Red Sea shipping. That the broader Red Sea shipping crisis was not resolved by this ceasefire — Suez Canal traffic remained 60% below pre-crisis levels throughout 2025. That the Houthis’ original stated reason for attacks — solidarity with Gaza — was resolved not by this ceasefire but by the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire (Item 141), after which the Houthis paused all attacks. That as of March 2026, Maersk and other major carriers have diverted back to the Cape of Good Hope after briefly resuming Red Sea transits. That the U.S. Maritime Administration’s own advisory (2025-012) continues to warn U.S.-flagged vessels of heightened risk in the Red Sea through March 2026.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

A ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis was announced on May 6, 2025, brokered by Oman. President Trump announced U.S. bombing would cease “effective immediately.” Oman’s Foreign Minister stated: “Neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping.” The ceasefire ended Operation Rough Rider, a seven-week U.S. bombing campaign that began March 15, 2025 and involved over 1,100 strikes on Houthi targets. ¹

The ceasefire explicitly excluded Israel-linked shipping and was ambiguous about non-U.S. vessels. Houthi chief negotiator Mohammed Abdul Salam stated the ceasefire did not apply “in any way, shape, or form” to Israel. Houthi spokesperson stated: “What changed is the American position, but our position remains firm.” A State Department spokesperson declined to clarify whether non-American ships were covered, referring reporters to Trump’s remarks instead. The agreement functionally protected only U.S.-affiliated vessels while leaving the broader shipping crisis unresolved. ²

The Houthis violated the ceasefire within two months, resuming attacks on non-U.S. commercial shipping. On July 6, 2025, the Houthis attacked and sank the Greek-owned, Liberian-flagged bulk carrier MV Magic Seas using drones, missiles, RPGs, and small boat attacks. The next day, they attacked the Liberian-flagged MV Eternity C, killing at least three crew members. Human Rights Watch described these attacks as “apparent war crimes.” The UN Secretary-General condemned the “resumption of Houthi attacks on civilian vessels.” The U.S. State Department also condemned the attacks, which violated the May ceasefire’s stated purpose of “ensuring freedom of navigation.” ³

Operation Rough Rider — the military campaign preceding the ceasefire — cost over $2 billion, killed at least 224 civilians, and failed to achieve its core objective. In 53 days, the U.S. conducted 339 strikes, surpassing the year-long Biden-era Operation Poseidon Archer. Airwars documented that the campaign nearly doubled the total U.S. civilian casualty toll in Yemen since 2002. West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center assessed that “U.S. strikes had caused ‘some degradation,’ but the Houthis were in a position to easily reconstitute.” The U.S. lost two F/A-18s ($134 million) and seven Reaper drones ($200 million). Pentagon planners raised concerns about ammunition shortages affecting Taiwan deterrence readiness. ⁴

Red Sea shipping did not recover following the May 2025 ceasefire. AP Moller-Maersk publicly stated it was “not ready to send ships through the Red Sea again, despite the ceasefire announcement.” Throughout 2025, Suez Canal deadweight tonnage transits remained 57-64% below 2023 levels. Container ship transits dropped 86% year-over-year during Q4 2025. Average daily ship transits via the Bab al-Mandab Strait stood at 37 in late November 2025, down from over 70 before the crisis. ⁵

The broader Houthi pause in attacks came after the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire, not the May 2025 U.S.-Houthi ceasefire. Since the Israel-Hamas ceasefire took effect on October 10, 2025, the Houthis ceased attacks on all vessels — including non-U.S. and Israel-linked shipping. The Houthis signaled this halt in an undated letter to Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigades, published in November 2025, but threatened to resume if Israel broke the ceasefire. Russia noted at the UN Security Council in January 2026 that “no incidents have been recorded in the Red Sea since September 2025, indicating that attacks in recent years were closely linked to the conflict in Gaza.” ⁶

As of March 2026, freedom of navigation in the Red Sea has not been restored. Maersk resumed limited Red Sea transits in December 2025 and announced a “structural return” to the Suez route in early February 2026. Less than a month later, on February 27, Maersk diverted multiple vessels back to the Cape of Good Hope route, citing “unforeseen constraints arising from the wider operating environment in the Red Sea region.” CMA CGM similarly reversed course in late January 2026. The MARAD Advisory 2025-012 — the U.S. government’s own warning to American commercial vessels — remained active through March 2026, advising U.S.-flagged vessels to turn off AIS transponders in the southern Red Sea due to heightened risk. Suez Canal authorities project a return to normal traffic levels no earlier than the second half of 2026. ⁷

Strong Inferences

Maritime war risk insurance premiums remain elevated far above pre-crisis levels. While premiums declined from their 2024 peak, Kpler’s November 2025 analysis concluded that “the path back to normalcy will be measured in quarters, not weeks, and some level of elevated risk pricing may become permanent.” Shipowners pay approximately 1% of vessel value for Red Sea transit, compared to 0.01-0.04% pre-crisis — a roughly 25-100x increase. Insurance industry experts stated that rates “won’t decline based on declarations from militant groups” but require “sustained periods without strikes, combined with meaningful political progress and verified capability reductions.” ⁸

The qualifier “U.S.-flagged ships” reveals the claim’s core weakness. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels represent a tiny fraction of global shipping. According to MARAD data, there are approximately 180 U.S.-flagged oceangoing commercial vessels out of roughly 55,000 in the global fleet. The Red Sea crisis disrupted approximately 12-15% of global trade, affecting thousands of ships from dozens of flag states. A ceasefire that technically protected only American-flagged vessels — while leaving attacks on all other shipping unaddressed — did not “restore freedom of navigation” in any meaningful sense. The claim quietly acknowledges this by including the qualifier, but the context of the “365 Wins” list frames it as a major foreign policy achievement rather than the narrow bilateral standoff it actually was. ⁹

The Houthi attacks were fundamentally driven by the Gaza war, and their cessation tracks the Gaza ceasefire timeline — not the U.S.-Houthi ceasefire. The Houthis began Red Sea attacks in November 2023 in declared solidarity with Palestinians. They paused after the January 2025 Gaza ceasefire, resumed when that ceasefire collapsed in March 2025, and paused again after the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire. The May 2025 U.S.-Houthi ceasefire addressed only U.S. targets and lasted less than two months before the July violations. The October 2025 Gaza ceasefire (Item 141) is what actually reduced Houthi attacks on all shipping. The causal chain the claim implies — U.S. ceasefire leads to restored navigation — is contradicted by the sequence of events. ¹⁰

What the Evidence Shows

The claim contains a factual kernel — a ceasefire between the U.S. and the Houthis was brokered by Oman on May 6, 2025 — wrapped in a characterization that inverts what actually happened.

The ceasefire followed Operation Rough Rider, a seven-week bombing campaign that cost over $2 billion, killed at least 224 civilians, and failed to establish air superiority over the Houthis or restore Red Sea freedom of navigation. West Point’s assessment concluded the campaign represented “a mismatch of a desired end state and the means used to achieve it.” While Trump characterized the deal as a Houthi “capitulation,” the Houthis claimed the U.S. “backed down,” and administration officials privately acknowledged the airstrikes “were not achieving their objectives.” The Soufan Center noted that the Houthis viewed the ceasefire as vindication that they could “outlast the United States.”

The ceasefire itself was narrow in scope — protecting only U.S.-affiliated vessels while explicitly leaving Israel-linked and other international shipping exposed. It lasted less than two months before the Houthis sank the MV Magic Seas and attacked the MV Eternity C, killing at least seven mariners. The claim that this restored “freedom of navigation” is directly contradicted by the U.S. government’s own MARAD advisory, which continued warning U.S.-flagged vessels of heightened risk through at least March 2026.

What actually reduced Houthi attacks on all shipping was not this ceasefire but the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire — the event the Houthis themselves had always identified as their condition for stopping. Even after that broader pause, Red Sea shipping has not recovered. Suez Canal traffic remained 57-64% below pre-crisis levels throughout 2025. Maersk’s attempt to resume Red Sea transits in early 2026 lasted less than a month before the company diverted back to the Cape of Good Hope. Insurance premiums remain 25-100 times pre-crisis levels. No major shipping company has committed to a sustained return to the Red Sea corridor.

The Bottom Line

Steel-man acknowledgment: The Trump administration did negotiate a bilateral ceasefire with the Houthis through Omani mediation, which technically halted Houthi attacks on U.S.-affiliated vessels. No U.S.-flagged vessel is known to have been attacked since May 6, 2025. The Maersk Denver, a U.S.-flagged vessel, successfully transited the Bab al-Mandab Strait on January 11-12, 2026. The ceasefire also ended the costly and controversial Operation Rough Rider, preventing further U.S. military expenditure and civilian casualties.

The core finding: The claim is mostly false because it misrepresents the scope, durability, and consequence of the ceasefire. The agreement protected only U.S.-flagged ships — a tiny sliver of global commerce — while leaving the broader Red Sea crisis unresolved. It was violated within two months by deadly Houthi attacks on non-U.S. shipping. The phrase “restoring freedom of navigation” is contradicted by every available metric: Suez Canal traffic down 60%, major carriers still routing around Africa, insurance premiums 25-100x above normal, and the U.S. government’s own maritime advisory warning American ships to turn off their transponders in the region. The actual reduction in Houthi attacks tracked the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire, not this bilateral deal. Claiming credit for “restoring freedom of navigation” when the Red Sea remains one of the most disrupted shipping corridors on Earth — and when the U.S. government is still warning its own vessels away from it — represents a fundamental disconnect between the claim and observable reality.

Footnotes

1. Oman Foreign Ministry statement on U.S.-Houthi ceasefire, May 6, 2025; Maritime Executive, “U.S. Suspends Bombing After New Ceasefire With Houthis,” May 6, 2025; Al Jazeera, “Trump says bombing of Yemen to stop as Oman confirms US-Houthi ceasefire,” May 6, 2025 ↩

2. Soufan Center, “U.S.-Houthi Ceasefire Leaves Questions Unanswered,” May 12, 2025; Maritime Executive, “U.S. Suspends Bombing,” May 6, 2025 ↩

3. Soufan Center, “Houthis Resume Red Sea Ship Attacks,” July 8, 2025; U.S. State Department, “Condemning Recent Houthi Attacks on MV Magic Seas and MV Eternity C,” July 2025; Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Houthis’ Attacks on Cargo Ships Apparent War Crimes,” July 23, 2025; UN Secretary-General statement SG/SM/22724, July 2025 ↩

4. CTC West Point, “An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider,” 2025; Airwars, “Trump Nearly Doubled U.S. Civilian Casualty Toll in Yemen,” 2025; Air and Space Forces Magazine, “Trump Says US Halting Military Campaign Against Houthis,” May 2025 ↩

5. Kpler, “Red Sea Risk: Why Maritime Insurance Won’t Return to Normal Anytime Soon,” November 27, 2025; Suez Canal Authority navigation statistics, 2025; FreightWaves, “Suez container ships near low for all of 2025,” November 2025 ↩

6. Al Jazeera, “Yemen’s Houthis appear to pull back from Red Sea shipping attacks,” November 11, 2025; UN Security Council Resolution 2812 (2026), adopted January 14, 2026; CNBC, “Israel-Hamas ceasefire will not bring global freight fleet back to Red Sea quickly,” October 13, 2025 ↩

7. gCaptain, “Red Sea Comeback Falters as Maersk Diverts Ships Back Around Cape,” February 2026; Maersk, “ME11 & MECL Sailing Changes,” February 27, 2026; MARAD Advisory 2025-012; Suez Canal Authority chairman Admiral Ossama Rabiee forecast, 2026 ↩

8. Kpler, “Red Sea Risk,” November 2025; S&P Global, “Maritime war risk premiums fall in Red Sea, rise in Black Sea,” December 4, 2025 ↩

9. MARAD U.S.-flagged fleet data; Soufan Center, “U.S.-Houthi Ceasefire Leaves Questions Unanswered,” May 12, 2025 ↩

10. Wilson Center, “Timeline: Houthi Attacks”; Al Jazeera, “Houthis appear to pull back,” November 11, 2025; Security Council Report, “Yemen February 2026 Monthly Forecast” ↩