365 Days of Claims
Claim #167 of 365
Mostly True but Misleading high confidence

The stated fact is accurate, but presenting it as a "win" obscures significant harm or context.

counterterrorismiraqisisairstrikeleadership-decapitationoverstatement

The Claim

Eliminated ISIS Chief of Global Operations Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rifai, the second most powerful leader in the Islamic State.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

The U.S. military killed a specific individual — Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rifai — who held the title “Chief of Global Operations” within ISIS and was the organization’s second most powerful leader. The claim presents this as a counterterrorism achievement under the current administration.

What is being implied but not asserted?

The framing implies a precise, hierarchical understanding of ISIS leadership — that al-Rifai was definitively the number-two figure in a command structure where such rankings are unambiguous. Positioned in the “Reasserting American Leadership” section alongside items 168 (Abbey Gate arrest) and 169 (Al-Qaeda leader elimination), the implication is of a systematic campaign dismantling terrorist organizations at the highest levels. The phrasing “second most powerful” suggests there is a clear leader above him and that al-Rifai’s rank is settled intelligence.

What is conspicuously absent?

The claim omits that al-Rifai’s exact position within ISIS was actively disputed among intelligence agencies and UN member states. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team identified al-Rifai as a candidate for the top position — potentially the caliph himself, not merely second-in-command. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani described him as the “deputy caliph” — a more senior framing than CENTCOM’s. The claim omits that al-Rifai had been designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the State Department in June 2023 under the Biden administration, meaning the intelligence work identifying him predated the current presidency. It omits that ISIS continued to operate, attack, and even kill Americans after al-Rifai’s elimination — including the December 2025 Palmyra insider attack that killed two U.S. service members and a civilian interpreter. It omits that by February 2026, ISIS was announcing “a new phase of operations” and ramping up attacks in Syria. And it omits that the broader pattern of leadership decapitation — spanning multiple caliphs and senior figures across a decade — has not eliminated the organization.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

CENTCOM conducted a precision airstrike in Iraq’s Anbar province on March 13, 2025 that killed Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rifai, confirmed by DNA analysis. CENTCOM announced the strike on March 15, 2025, titling its press release “CENTCOM Forces Kill ISIS Chief of Global Operations Who Also Served as ISIS #2.” The strike used a “double-tap” approach — two munitions struck al-Rifai’s vehicle in rapid succession as it traveled through the Iraqi countryside. A second ISIS operative was also killed. Both bodies were recovered wearing unexploded suicide vests with multiple weapons. DNA analysis confirmed al-Rifai’s identity using evidence collected during a previous raid from which he had narrowly escaped. CENTCOM conducted the strike in cooperation with Iraqi Intelligence and Security Forces. 1

CENTCOM described al-Rifai as responsible for global ISIS operations, logistics, planning, and finance. CENTCOM identified al-Rifai by his alias Abu Khadijah and called him “the Emir of ISIS’ most senior decision-making body” who “maintained responsibility for operations, logistics, and planning conducted by ISIS globally, and directs a significant portion of finance for the group’s global organization.” Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla stated al-Rifai was “one of the most important ISIS members in the entire global ISIS organization.” The General Directorate of Provinces, which al-Rifai headed, coordinates IS activities across 12 provinces in Asia and Africa — including operations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, and the Philippines. 2

The UN Monitoring Team identified al-Rifai as a candidate for the top ISIS position — potentially the caliph, not merely second-in-command. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s February 2025 report (S/2025/71) documented that “Member States hold divergent views as to the identity of ISIL (Da’esh) leader Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.” The team identified al-Rifai and Abdul Qadir Mumin as candidates, noting their “key positions in the General Directorate of Provinces and overall direction” of the group. The report stated “the two top [IS] positions are caliph and General Directorate of Provinces head.” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani went further, calling al-Rifai the “deputy caliph” and “one of the most dangerous terrorists in Iraq and the world.” The dispute meant al-Rifai may have been either the first or second most powerful ISIS leader — the White House claim of “second most powerful” may actually understate his role. 3

Al-Rifai had been designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the U.S. State Department on June 8, 2023, under the Biden administration. The Federal Register notice identified him as emir of Bilad al-Rafidayn — ISIS’s Iraq division within the General Directorate of Provinces. He was designated alongside Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki. This means the intelligence community’s identification and tracking of al-Rifai as a senior ISIS figure began well before the Trump administration took office. 4

ISIS has lost multiple caliphs and senior leaders to U.S. strikes without being eliminated as an organization. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in October 2019. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi was killed in February 2022. Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi died in November 2022 (reported killed by Turkish-backed forces). Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurayshi was killed in April 2023, and Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi was named successor in August 2023. In August 2024, a U.S.-Iraqi raid in western Iraq killed four additional senior leaders, including Ahmad Hamid Husayn Abd-al-Jalil al-Ithawi — the man responsible for all ISIS operations in Iraq and himself identified by the UN as another potential caliph candidate — along with a $5 million Rewards for Justice target. Despite these losses, the UN estimated 1,500-3,000 ISIS fighters remained active as of late 2024. 5

ISIS continued to conduct attacks and kill Americans after al-Rifai’s elimination. On December 13, 2025 — nine months after al-Rifai’s death — an ISIS infiltrator within Syrian security forces killed two U.S. service members (Sgt. Edgar Brian Torres-Tovar and Sgt. William Nathaniel Howard) and a civilian interpreter (Ayad Mansoor Sakat) in Palmyra, Syria. By December 2025, CENTCOM reported ISIS had “inspired at least 11 plots or attacks against targets in the United States over the past year.” In February 2026, an ISIS spokesman announced “a new phase of operations,” and the group executed at least six attacks across Raqqa and Deir Ezzour provinces in three days. The UN estimated roughly 3,000 fighters remained across Syria and Iraq. 6

Strong Inferences

Al-Rifai’s elimination was a significant tactical achievement but did not degrade ISIS’s operational capability. The ICCT assessed in 2025 that ISIS has evolved into “a hybrid model that balances regional autonomy with centralised oversight,” enabling it to absorb leadership losses. The Soufan Center noted ISIS remains “a major counterterrorism challenge for the foreseeable future.” The sustained tempo of ISIS operations throughout 2025 and into 2026 — including attacks on Americans, domestic terror plots in the U.S., continued recruitment, and a declared new offensive campaign in Syria — indicates that removing the head of the General Directorate of Provinces did not meaningfully disrupt the organization’s decentralized operational model. 7

The “Chief of Global Operations” title, while accurately reflecting al-Rifai’s role, describes the leadership of a diminished organization. ISIS in 2025 is not the organization that once controlled territory the size of the United Kingdom with up to 80,000 fighters. It has no territory, an estimated 1,500-3,000 fighters dispersed across multiple countries, and operates through clandestine cells rather than conventional military formations. The GDP coordinates seven regional offices across Africa, Asia, and Europe — a real operational structure — but the “Chief of Global Operations” title carries strategic weight to a general audience that exceeds what this diminished force represents. 8

The strike reflects continuity with prior administrations’ counterterrorism approach rather than a novel Trump-era initiative. The counter-ISIS campaign (Operation Inherent Resolve) has been continuous since 2014 across three administrations. The Biden administration designated al-Rifai as a global terrorist in June 2023. The September 2024 raid under Biden killed four senior leaders including another caliph candidate. The intelligence and military infrastructure that located al-Rifai was built and maintained across administrations. CENTCOM’s Gen. Kurilla — who oversaw the strike — was appointed by Biden. The claim’s placement under Trump’s “wins” obscures this institutional continuity. 9

What the Evidence Shows

The core factual claim is substantially accurate: CENTCOM killed al-Rifai in a precision airstrike in Anbar province on March 13, 2025, and CENTCOM itself described him as the “Chief of Global Operations for ISIS and the Delegated Committee Emir.” This is confirmed by CENTCOM’s announcement, DNA verification, corroboration from the Iraqi government, and independent reporting from multiple news organizations. Al-Rifai was undeniably a high-value target, and the strike was a real counterterrorism operation with real results.

The characterization of al-Rifai as “the second most powerful leader” is where the claim begins to oversimplify. The White House presents this as settled fact, but the UN Monitoring Team documented active disagreement among member states about al-Rifai’s exact position. Some assessments placed him not as number two, but as the potential caliph — the actual leader of ISIS. Iraqi PM al-Sudani called him the “deputy caliph.” The irony is that the administration may be understating al-Rifai’s significance in order to present the more rhetorically useful framing of “number two eliminated” rather than the more complex “we may have killed the actual leader but no one is sure.” CENTCOM’s own press release title hedged this, stating he “also served as ISIS #2” — acknowledging that this was one characterization among others.

The deeper misleading element is what the claim invites the reader to conclude: that eliminating the “second most powerful” ISIS leader meaningfully degraded the organization. The evidence runs directly counter to this. Nine months after al-Rifai’s death, ISIS conducted an insider attack that killed three Americans in Syria. The organization continued to inspire domestic plots, recruit fighters, and mount attacks. By early 2026, it was launching a coordinated offensive campaign in Syria and the UN still estimated 3,000 fighters across the region. The history of ISIS leadership decapitation — spanning at least five caliphs and dozens of senior figures across a decade — demonstrates that the organization has repeatedly reconstituted its command structure after high-profile losses. The ICCT assessed that ISIS’s hybrid organizational model “prioritises flexibility and security over centralised control,” precisely because the group has adapted to leadership decapitation as a routine hazard.

The attribution question also matters. Al-Rifai was designated a terrorist under the Biden administration in 2023. The intelligence infrastructure that tracked him was multi-year and multi-administration. Gen. Kurilla was a Biden appointee. The operation, while carried out under Trump’s authority, was the product of institutional capabilities built across presidencies — a pattern consistent with items 168 and 169 in this series.

The Bottom Line

The strike that killed al-Rifai was a genuine, significant counterterrorism achievement. CENTCOM’s characterization of his role is supported by the agency’s own intelligence and corroborated by the Iraqi government’s reaction. Al-Rifai was a high-value target whose elimination was worth pursuing. The steel-man case for this claim is straightforward: the U.S. killed a very senior ISIS leader, DNA-confirmed, wearing a suicide vest, coordinating operations across a dozen provinces — and that is a real accomplishment.

But the claim’s framing is misleading in two respects. First, describing al-Rifai as definitively “the second most powerful leader” imposes false certainty on a genuinely disputed intelligence question — he may have been the most powerful, or his exact position may be unknowable given ISIS’s deliberate opacity about its leadership. Second, and more important, the claim implies a strategic impact that the subsequent evidence does not support. ISIS continued to operate, attack, kill Americans, and even escalate after this elimination. Presenting a single strike as a standalone “win” in a decades-long, multi-administration counterterrorism campaign — while omitting the intelligence community’s disagreement about the target’s role, the organization’s demonstrated resilience, and the bipartisan institutional continuity that made the strike possible — gives the claim a significance that the subsequent evidence contradicts.

Footnotes

  1. CENTCOM Press Release, “CENTCOM Forces Kill ISIS Chief of Global Operations Who Also Served as ISIS #2,” March 15, 2025. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4121311/centcom-forces-kill-isis-chief-of-global-operations-who-also-served-as-isis-2/; Task & Purpose, “US forces kill ISIS’s second in command in Iraq strike,” March 15, 2025. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/centcom-iraq-isis-abu-khadijah/; FDD’s Long War Journal, “US strike in Iraq eliminates top Islamic State leader,” March 15, 2025. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/03/us-strike-in-iraq-eliminates-top-islamic-state-leader.php ↩

  2. CENTCOM Press Release, March 15, 2025; ABC News, “ISIS’ chief of global operations killed in precision airstrike in Iraq: CENTCOM,” March 15, 2025. https://abcnews.com/US/centcom-forces-kill-isis-chief-global-operations-precision/story?id=119825288; CTC West Point, “The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network.” https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network/ ↩

  3. UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report (S/2025/71), February 2025, cited in Long War Journal, March 15, 2025; Just Security, “Wake Up Call: UN Security Council’s Report on ISIS and al-Qaeda,” 2025. https://www.justsecurity.org/98429/security-council-report-isis-qaeda/; Al Jazeera, “Iraq says ‘dangerous’ ISIL leader Abu Khadija killed,” March 14, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/14/iraq-says-dangerous-isil-leader-abu-khadija-killed ↩

  4. Federal Register, “Designation of Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rufay’i and Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki as Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” June 16, 2023. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/16/2023-12870/designation-of-abdallah-makki-muslih-al-rufayi-and-abu-bakr-ibn-muhammad-ibn-ali-al-mainuki-as; ICCT, “The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response.” https://icct.nl/publication/islamic-state-2025-evolving-threat-facing-waning-global-response ↩

  5. FDD’s Long War Journal, “US and Iraqi forces kill Islamic State leaders,” September 2024. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/09/us-and-iraqi-forces-kill-islamic-state-leaders.php; FDD’s Long War Journal, “US strike in Iraq eliminates top Islamic State leader,” March 15, 2025; Al Jazeera, “ISIL confirms death of leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, names successor,” August 3, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/3/isil-confirms-death-of-leader-abu-hussein-al-qurashi-names-successor ↩

  6. FDD’s Long War Journal, “3 Americans killed, 3 injured in Islamic State ambush attack in Palmyra, Syria,” December 13, 2025. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/12/3-americans-killed-3-injured-in-islamic-state-ambush-attack-in-palmyra-syria.php; FDD’s Long War Journal, “US highlights anti-Islamic State operations after soldiers killed in Syria,” December 19, 2025; FDD’s Long War Journal, “Islamic State ramps up attacks on Syrian government after issuing threats,” February 23, 2026. ↩

  7. ICCT, “The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response,” 2025. https://icct.nl/publication/islamic-state-2025-evolving-threat-facing-waning-global-response; Soufan Center, “Nearing the End of 2025, What is the State of the Islamic State?,” December 19, 2025. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-december-19/ ↩

  8. UN estimate of 1,500-3,000 ISIS fighters, cited in Long War Journal, September 2024; CTC West Point, “The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network.” https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network/; ICCT, 2025. ↩

  9. FDD’s Long War Journal, “US and Iraqi forces kill Islamic State leaders,” September 2024; Federal Register, June 2023 designation; FDD’s Long War Journal, “US continues to target the Islamic State’s network in Iraq and Syria,” January 7, 2025. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/01/us-continues-to-target-the-islamic-states-network-in-iraq-and-syria.php ↩