The Claim

Designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as Foreign Terrorist Organizations for supporting Hamas.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

That the Trump administration designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) — the most severe terrorism designation available under U.S. law — and that the basis for designation was these branches’ support for Hamas.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That these branches are operationally equivalent to terrorist organizations like Hamas, ISIS, or al-Qaeda. That they pose a direct security threat to the United States. That the FTO designation represents a meaningful counterterrorism action that disrupts actual terrorist financing or operations. That opposing the Muslim Brotherhood is synonymous with opposing terrorism.

What is conspicuously absent?

The claim misstates the designation type. The Egyptian and Jordanian branches were designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) — the lesser designation — not as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Only the Lebanese branch (al-Jamaa al-Islamiya), which the claim does not mention, received the FTO designation. The claim omits that the Muslim Brotherhood is a political movement, not a paramilitary one — the Egyptian Brotherhood formally renounced violence decades ago. It omits that the Jordanian Brotherhood was a legal political party whose affiliated Islamic Action Front won the most parliamentary seats in Jordan’s most recent elections. It omits that Trump’s own State Department concluded during his first term that an FTO designation of the Brotherhood would be “difficult to justify legally.” It omits that Egypt’s Sisi government — which seized power by overthrowing the Brotherhood’s democratically elected president in 2013 — has lobbied for this designation for years. It omits the distinction between Hamas (already a designated FTO since 1997) and the broader Brotherhood movement. And it omits the third branch that was actually designated — the Lebanese al-Jamaa al-Islamiya, which received the more severe FTO label.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

President Trump signed an executive order on November 24, 2025, initiating a process to designate Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon as terrorist organizations. The EO directed the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and DNI, to submit a joint report within 30 days recommending designations, with formal designation to follow within 45 days of the report. The stated justification cited the chapters’ “alleged support for Hamas” and claims they “engage in or facilitate and support violence and destabilization campaigns.” The legal authorities invoked were the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), and Executive Order 13224. ¹

The formal designations were completed on January 13, 2026 — but not as the claim describes. The Treasury Department designated the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood chapters as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). The State Department designated Lebanon’s al-Jamaa al-Islamiya as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The SDGT and FTO designations are legally distinct: SDGT imposes economic sanctions and asset blocking, while FTO additionally creates federal criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. Section 2339B for “knowingly providing material support or resources” — carrying penalties of up to 20 years imprisonment. The claim states the Egyptian and Jordanian branches were designated as FTOs; they were designated as SDGTs, the lesser category. ²

The Muslim Brotherhood is a political movement with national chapters that vary significantly in ideology, strategy, and relationship to violence. The Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 as a religious, social, and political organization. Brookings Institution analysis concluded the Brotherhood “is not in a meaningful sense a single organization at all” — it is “too diffuse and diverse to characterize” as a single entity. The Egyptian Brotherhood’s leadership formally renounced revolutionary violence decades ago. Brotherhood-affiliated parties hold parliamentary seats and participate in democratic governance in multiple countries. Hamas, the Palestinian branch, is an exception — it has been a separately designated FTO since 1997 and has engaged in sustained armed conflict with Israel. ³

Trump’s own State Department concluded during his first term (2017-2020) that an FTO designation of the Muslim Brotherhood would be legally difficult to justify. In 2019, after Egyptian President Sisi reportedly pressed Trump to designate the Brotherhood, State Department officials concluded “it would be difficult to justify legally” because the Brotherhood as a whole does not meet the three statutory criteria for FTO designation: (1) it is a foreign organization, (2) it engages in terrorism or retains the capability and intent to do so, and (3) its terrorist activity threatens U.S. nationals or national security. The 2025 approach — designating specific national chapters rather than the entire organization — appears designed to navigate around this legal obstacle, though it remains untested in court. ⁴

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was a legal political party with deep roots in Jordanian civic life until Jordan banned it in April 2025. The Brotherhood “operated legally in Jordan for decades and has widespread grassroots support in major urban centres and dozens of offices across the country.” Its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), won the most parliamentary seats in Jordan’s most recent elections, amid mass protests against Israel’s war on Gaza. Jordan’s Interior Minister announced a sweeping ban on April 23, 2025, citing members “found to be linked to a sabotage plot,” including alleged explosives manufacturing. The IAF sought to distance itself from the Brotherhood, claiming it would continue as “a fully independent Jordanian political party.” ⁵

Egypt designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013, six months after the military coup that overthrew the Brotherhood’s democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi. President Sisi has maintained this designation and has presided over a systematic campaign of mass arrests, death sentences, and life imprisonment against Brotherhood members. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry welcomed the U.S. designation as a “pivotal step” reflecting the group’s “extremist ideology.” The Egyptian Brotherhood’s acting general guide, Salah Abdel Haq, called the U.S. designation “unsupported by credible evidence” and suggested it reflected “external foreign pressure by the UAE and Israel.” ⁶

Strong Inferences

The designation serves Egypt’s Sisi government far more than it serves U.S. counterterrorism objectives. Sisi has lobbied successive U.S. administrations to designate the Brotherhood since seizing power in 2013. The designation gives U.S. imprimatur to Egypt’s characterization of its primary domestic political opposition as terrorists — a characterization used to justify mass imprisonment, death sentences, and the suppression of democratic politics. The Obama, first-term Trump, and Biden administrations all declined or failed to complete such a designation, in part because the Brotherhood’s political character made it a poor fit for terrorism frameworks. Sisi’s government immediately welcomed the designation; no other U.S. ally in the region endorsed it publicly. ⁷

The designation conflates political Islam with terrorism, creating a framework that criminalizes political opposition to authoritarian allies. The legal threshold for FTO designation requires demonstrating the organization “engages in terrorism or retains capability and intent to do so” and that this “threatens U.S. nationals or national security.” The Muslim Brotherhood’s Egyptian and Jordanian branches are primarily political organizations. Designating them as terrorists — even under the lesser SDGT category — effectively endorses the position that political Islamism is inherently terroristic, regardless of whether the specific organization engages in or supports violence. This is the framework that Brookings warned would be “understood by many Muslims around the world as a declaration of war against non-violent political Islamists.” ⁸

The Hamas nexus, while historically real, does not automatically make every Brotherhood chapter a Hamas support network. Hamas emerged from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 and has been a separately designated FTO since 1997. The historical and ideological connection between Hamas and the broader Brotherhood is real. But the Brotherhood’s decentralized structure means chapters operate independently, with different political strategies, different relationships to violence, and different positions on Hamas. The Egyptian Brotherhood — operating under extreme repression since 2013, with its leadership imprisoned or exiled — is not in a practical position to serve as a significant Hamas financing conduit, even if individual members have expressed support. The administration’s own EO was notably vague on the specific evidence of “material support,” citing an unnamed Egyptian Brotherhood leader who “called for violent attacks” during the Gaza conflict. ⁹

The designation follows the administration’s pattern of using terrorism labels as political signals rather than operational counterterrorism tools. This mirrors the pattern seen in items 36 (85,000 cartel identities added to terrorism databases), 65 (Antifa designated as domestic terrorist organization), and 160 (Houthi FTO redesignation). In each case, the designation is presented as a standalone achievement without evidence that it disrupted actual terrorist operations, changed targeted behavior, or improved U.S. security. The Muslim Brotherhood designation adds another entry to this pattern: the label changes; the underlying dynamics do not. ¹⁰

What the Evidence Shows

The claim contains a factual error at its core: the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood branches were designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, not as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Only the Lebanese branch — which the claim does not mention — received the more severe FTO designation. This is not a minor distinction. The difference between SDGT and FTO is the difference between economic sanctions and federal criminal liability for material support. The claim overstates what actually happened.

Even setting aside the mislabeling, the designation raises serious questions about whether these organizations meet the statutory criteria for any terrorism designation. The Muslim Brotherhood is fundamentally a political movement. The Egyptian branch formally renounced violence decades ago and has been operating under extreme repression since Sisi’s 2013 coup. The Jordanian branch was a legal political party whose affiliated party won the most seats in Jordan’s most recent parliamentary elections. Trump’s own State Department concluded during his first term that designation would be “difficult to justify legally.” The 2025 executive order’s stated justification — “alleged support for Hamas” — was notably vague, citing an unnamed leader who “called for violent attacks” without specifying concrete evidence of material support.

The cui bono question points strongly toward Egypt’s Sisi government. Sisi has sought this designation since 2013, when he overthrew the Brotherhood’s democratically elected president and needed to reframe his primary political opposition as a terrorist threat rather than a suppressed democratic movement. Every previous U.S. administration declined. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry immediately welcomed the designation as a “pivotal step.” The Egyptian Brotherhood, in turn, characterized it as reflecting “external foreign pressure by the UAE and Israel” — a claim consistent with the longstanding regional dynamic in which the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have pressed the U.S. to treat political Islamism as terrorism.

The broader context includes the administration’s pattern of using terrorism designations as political signaling: cartels designated as FTOs to inflate terrorism databases (item 36), Antifa designated to target political opposition (item 65), Houthis redesignated without clear operational benefit (item 160). The Muslim Brotherhood designation fits this pattern — a label deployed for political purposes, presented as a counterterrorism achievement, without evidence that it disrupts actual terrorist operations or financing.

The Bottom Line

Steel-man acknowledgment: The Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood connection is historically real, and Hamas did emerge from the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood. Individual Brotherhood members across multiple countries have expressed support for Hamas, and some may have provided material assistance. The administration can argue that designating chapters that provide support to a designated FTO is a legitimate counterterrorism action, and that the chapter-by-chapter approach — rather than designating the entire Brotherhood — shows targeted judgment. The Lebanese al-Jamaa al-Islamiya’s alleged participation in armed operations alongside Hezbollah provides a stronger factual basis for that branch’s FTO designation.

The core finding: The claim is misleading on multiple levels. First, it misstates the designation type: the Egyptian and Jordanian branches were designated as SDGTs, not FTOs — the claim inflates the severity of the action. Second, it omits the third branch (Lebanese) that actually received the FTO designation. Third, the underlying action designates political organizations as terrorist entities based on vague allegations of Hamas support, in a context where the primary beneficiary is Egypt’s military government — which has lobbied for this designation since overthrowing the Brotherhood’s elected government in 2013. Fourth, the designation follows a pattern of using terrorism labels as political tools rather than operational counterterrorism measures. The Brotherhood’s political character, its prior legal status in Jordan, Trump’s own first-term State Department’s rejection of designation, and the vague evidentiary basis all suggest this is a diplomatic concession to authoritarian allies dressed as a counterterrorism win.

Footnotes

1. White House, “Designation of Certain Muslim Brotherhood Chapters as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” Executive Order, November 24, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/11/designation-of-certain-muslim-brotherhood-chapters-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/ ↩

2. Al Jazeera, “US labels Muslim Brotherhood orgs in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan as ‘terrorist,’” January 13, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/13/us-labels-muslim-brotherhood-orgs-in-egypt-lebanon-jordan-as-terrorist ↩

3. Brookings Institution, “Should the Muslim Brotherhood Be Designated a Terrorist Organization?” January 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-muslim-brotherhood-be-designated-a-terrorist-organization/ ↩

4. Brookings Institution, “Should the Muslim Brotherhood Be Designated a Terrorist Organization?” January 2017 (citing State Department officials’ conclusion during Trump’s first term); 8 U.S.C. Section 1189(a)(1). ↩

5. Al Jazeera, “Jordan outlaws Muslim Brotherhood group, confiscates assets,” April 23, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/23/jordan-outlaws-muslim-brotherhood-group-confiscates-assets ↩

6. Al Jazeera, “US labels Muslim Brotherhood orgs in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan as ‘terrorist,’” January 13, 2026; Al Jazeera, “Trump orders blacklisting Muslim Brotherhood branches as ‘terrorist’ groups,” November 24, 2025. ↩

7. Al Jazeera, “Trump orders blacklisting Muslim Brotherhood branches as ‘terrorist’ groups,” November 24, 2025; Al Jazeera, “US labels Muslim Brotherhood orgs in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan as ‘terrorist,’” January 13, 2026 (Egypt’s Foreign Ministry reaction). ↩

8. Brookings Institution, “Should the Muslim Brotherhood Be Designated a Terrorist Organization?” January 2017; 8 U.S.C. Section 1189(a)(1)(B)-(C). ↩

9. White House EO, November 24, 2025 (citing unnamed Egyptian Brotherhood leader); Brookings 2017 analysis of Brotherhood’s decentralized structure. ↩

10. See analyses of items 36 (cartel FTO designation inflating terrorism databases), 65 (Antifa designation), 160 (Houthi FTO redesignation). ↩