The Claim

Imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court, which has illegitimately asserted jurisdiction over internal U.S. matters.

The Claim, Unpacked

What is literally being asserted?

Two things: (1) the administration imposed sanctions on the ICC, and (2) the ICC “illegitimately asserted jurisdiction over internal U.S. matters.” The first is a factual claim about an executive action. The second is a legal characterization presented as settled fact.

What is being implied but not asserted?

That the ICC was investigating purely domestic American affairs — as though a foreign court were reaching into U.S. territory to judge internal conduct. This framing suggests an offense against sovereignty, casting the sanctions as defensive rather than punitive.

What is conspicuously absent?

The actual trigger for the sanctions. The February 2025 executive order was explicitly motivated by the ICC’s November 2024 arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant — not by any pending investigation of Americans. The ICC’s separate investigation touching U.S. personnel in Afghanistan had already been deprioritized by Prosecutor Karim Khan in September 2021. The claim elides that the sanctions were primarily about protecting Israeli allies, not defending American sovereignty.

Also absent: this is a repeat of a Trump first-term policy. Executive Order 13928 (June 2020) imposed similar sanctions, targeting then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and a senior aide. Biden revoked those sanctions in April 2021. The second-term sanctions are a reinstatement and escalation, not a novel action.

Evidence Assessment

Established Facts

The administration signed Executive Order 14203 on February 6, 2025, titled “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court.” The order declares ICC actions against U.S. and Israeli personnel an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security, invoking IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002. It blocks the property and interests of designated ICC officials and restricts their entry into the United States. ¹

OFAC established a dedicated “International Criminal Court-Related Sanctions” program. The program was listed on OFAC’s sanctions programs page as of December 18, 2025, confirming implementation through standard Treasury sanctions infrastructure with designees placed on the SDN (Specially Designated Nationals) list. ²

By December 2025, the administration had sanctioned eleven ICC officials — three prosecutors and eight judges. The initial annex designated only Prosecutor Karim Khan (UK). Subsequent rounds in June, August, and December 2025 added prosecutors Nazhat Shameem Khan (Fiji) and Mame Mandiaye Niang (Senegal), and judges Reine Alapini-Gansou (Benin, ICC Vice-President), Solomy Balungi Bossa (Uganda), Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza (Peru), Kimberly Prost (Canada), Gocha Lordkipanidze (Georgia), Erdenebalsuren Damdin (Mongolia), Nicolas Guillou (France), and Beti Hohler (Slovenia). Sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans. ³

The ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant on November 21, 2024, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Charges included “starvation as a method of warfare.” The executive order explicitly references these warrants as part of its justification. ⁴

The ICC’s Afghanistan investigation was narrowed in September 2021 to deprioritize U.S. and CIA personnel. Prosecutor Khan sought authorization to resume the investigation with a focus on Taliban and ISIS-K crimes, effectively shelving the aspects that had directly concerned U.S. military and intelligence personnel. ⁵

The United States sanctioned ICC officials during Trump’s first term under Executive Order 13928 (June 11, 2020). Then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and Phakiso Mochochoko were designated in September 2020. Biden revoked EO 13928 and lifted all sanctions on April 1, 2021. ⁶

The ICC exercises territorial jurisdiction under the Rome Statute. Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a state party, regardless of the nationality of the suspect. Afghanistan was a state party (accession 2003). Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute in 2015. This territorial principle is a standard feature of international criminal law, not a novel assertion of authority. ⁷

Strong Inferences

The sanctions were primarily motivated by the Netanyahu/Gallant warrants, not by any active investigation of Americans. The timing is clear: the warrants were issued November 21, 2024; the executive order followed on February 6, 2025 — just seventeen days into the new administration. The order’s text explicitly references the Israeli warrants. Meanwhile, the Afghanistan investigation’s U.S.-focused components had been dormant since 2021. The claim’s framing as defense of American sovereignty does not match the executive order’s own stated justifications. ⁸

The characterization of ICC jurisdiction as “illegitimate” is a U.S. policy position, not a statement of settled law. The U.S. has consistently objected to the ICC asserting jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties. However, the ICC’s jurisdictional basis — territorial jurisdiction over crimes on state party territory — is grounded in the Rome Statute’s text and supported by the Assembly of States Parties. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s jurisdictional rulings have been upheld through the ICC’s own appellate process. International law scholars are divided on the edges of this question, but describing the ICC’s position as straightforwardly “illegitimate” conflates a political objection with a legal conclusion. ⁹

The claim that jurisdiction was asserted over “internal U.S. matters” is misleading. Neither the Afghanistan investigation (crimes alleged on Afghan territory) nor the Palestine investigation (crimes alleged on Palestinian territory) concerns conduct that occurred within the United States. These are extraterritorial actions by U.S. and Israeli personnel on the territory of ICC member states. Calling them “internal U.S. matters” mischaracterizes the geographic and legal reality. ¹⁰

What the Evidence Shows

The factual core of the claim is straightforward: the administration did impose sanctions on the ICC. Executive Order 14203, signed February 6, 2025, established a dedicated sanctions program that ultimately designated eleven ICC officials — prosecutors and judges — with asset freezes, travel bans, and prohibitions on U.S. persons providing them services. This is a real and consequential executive action.

But every other element of the claim distorts the picture. The phrase “internal U.S. matters” is factually wrong. The ICC investigations at issue concern alleged crimes on the territory of Afghanistan and Palestine — both ICC member states. No ICC investigation concerns conduct within U.S. borders. The word “illegitimately” presents a contested U.S. policy position as though it were settled law. The Rome Statute’s territorial jurisdiction principle — that the court can investigate crimes committed on member state territory regardless of the suspect’s nationality — is the standard reading of the treaty by 124 state parties, the ICC’s own chambers, and the majority of international law scholarship. The U.S. disagrees, but disagreement is not the same as illegitimacy.

Most critically, the claim frames the sanctions as defense of American sovereignty, when the executive order’s own text reveals the primary trigger was the ICC’s warrants against Israeli leaders. The Afghanistan investigation’s U.S.-focused components had been dormant since 2021. By contrast, the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants were issued just weeks before Trump took office, and the EO explicitly references them. The escalating designations throughout 2025 — ultimately targeting the specific judges who participated in those warrant proceedings — confirm this motivation. The sanctions were less about protecting Americans than about shielding a key ally from international criminal accountability.

The action also has historical precedent within Trump’s own record. First-term EO 13928 imposed similar sanctions on ICC Prosecutor Bensouda in 2020, also prompted by the Afghanistan investigation. Biden lifted those sanctions in 2021. The second-term sanctions represent a reinstatement and significant escalation — from two officials to eleven — not a novel policy departure.

The Bottom Line

The administration genuinely imposed sanctions on the ICC — this is documented fact, not spin. The executive order, OFAC designations, and escalating rounds of sanctions against eleven prosecutors and judges are real. To the extent the claim asserts that the administration took action against the ICC, it is accurate.

But the framing is misleading on every dimension that matters. The ICC did not assert jurisdiction over “internal U.S. matters” — it investigated alleged crimes on the territory of member states, which is exactly what the Rome Statute authorizes. The characterization of ICC jurisdiction as “illegitimate” presents a contested U.S. policy position as settled law. And the omission of the actual trigger — the Netanyahu and Gallant arrest warrants — transforms what was primarily an act of alliance solidarity into a narrative of sovereign self-defense. The claim is true on the narrowest factual reading and misleading on everything it implies.

Footnotes

1. Executive Order, “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court,” White House, February 6, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/ ↩

2. OFAC, “Sanctions Programs and Country Information,” U.S. Treasury Department, accessed March 18, 2026. https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information ↩

3. Opinio Juris, “US Sanctions Against the ICC: From Stupor to Action,” December 19, 2025. https://opiniojuris.org/2025/12/19/us-sanctions-against-the-icc-from-stupor-to-action/ ↩

4. Encyclopaedia Britannica, “International Criminal Court,” accessed March 18, 2026. https://www.britannica.com/topic/International-Criminal-Court ↩

5. Opinio Juris, “ICC Sanctions Symposium: Implications of Trump Administration’s Sanctions on International Criminal Court Officials,” April 22, 2021. https://opiniojuris.org/2021/04/22/icc-sanctions-symposium-implications-of-trump-administrations-sanctions-on-international-criminal-court-officials/ ↩

6. Opinio Juris, “ICC Sanctions Symposium,” April 22, 2021; see also Biden Executive Order terminating the ICC national emergency, April 1, 2021. https://opiniojuris.org/2021/04/22/icc-sanctions-symposium-implications-of-trump-administrations-sanctions-on-international-criminal-court-officials/ ↩

7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 12(2)(a). https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf ↩

8. Opinio Juris, “Artificial Sanctions: Potential Implications of US Sanctions on the ICC’s use of AI and Digital Evidence,” February 25, 2025. https://opiniojuris.org/2025/02/25/artificial-sanctions-potential-implications-of-us-sanctions-on-the-iccs-use-of-ai-and-digital-evidence/ ↩

9. Rome Statute, Article 12(2)(a); EJIL: Talk!, “Sanctions, Coercion and the Right to Development,” June 11, 2025. https://www.ejiltalk.org/sanctions-coercion-and-the-right-to-development/ ↩

10. Executive Order text references investigations in Afghanistan and warrants related to Palestine situation, not investigations into conduct within U.S. territory. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/ ↩